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INTRODUCTION
Employers cannot use different employment tests for different racial groups,
even if they might have good, nondiscriminatory reasons for doing so. Imagine
that, in making promotions to the rank of firefighter captain, the City of
Springfield administers an exam with two parts—a written component and a field
test component. Historically, the city has weighted the written and field components equally (50% each). If the city obtains evidence that the written test is highly
predictive of future success for white candidates but not for nonwhite ones, and
that the opposite is true for the field test, then the city may have legitimate reasons
for weighting the exam differently for the two groups. Based on its data, the city
might want to weight the exam for white candidates at 75% written test and 25%
field test but reverse those percentages for nonwhite candidates. The city may also
have other reasons to weight components differently, including attaining diversity
goals or avoiding disparate impact from equally weighted testing.
Despite the city’s legitimate ends, differentially weighting the exam according
to race would violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1 and may also violate the

1. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(l) (2012)) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the
selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use
different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that separating civil service exam scores by race and sex constituted the use of different score
cutoffs in violation of Title VII); see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 224 (9th ed. 2017) (explaining that differential test
validation by race violates section 703(l) of Title VII).
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constitutional guarantee of equal protection.2 A 1991 amendment to Title VII forbids adjusting the scores of, or using different cutoff scores for, “employment
related tests” on the basis of race.3 The amendment banned the controversial practice of “race-norming” aptitude test scores.4 Following the 1991 amendment,
employers may not use different test standards for different racial groups, even if
there might be a legitimate business reason or valid affirmative action justification for doing so.5
Now, what if instead of differentially weighting two exam components, the
city wanted to make its promotion decisions using a machine-learning algorithm,
and that algorithm weighted some observed variables differently for white and
nonwhite candidates? Machine learning is an “automated process of discovering
correlations” that can be used “to make predictions or estimates of some outcomes.”6 The relevant prediction here is whether the applicant for promotion is
likely to be successful in the position (here, of captain). The data made available
to the algorithm when searching for correlations could include information about
each applicant’s race. In other words, the race variable could be used by the algorithm in generating its predictions. If the employer’s end goal is legitimate, is
using a race-aware algorithm legal? What if the employer’s legitimate goal for
using race in the algorithm is to counteract the statistical disparate impact on
racial minorities that the algorithm would otherwise produce if it were blinded to
race? Courts will soon be facing these questions, and the answers are not clear.
Race-aware algorithms will force courts to confront anew tensions between competing purposes of discrimination law.7 Law that was developed to govern human
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Dean, 438 F.3d at 454–62 (remanding for a determination of
whether city’s race-conscious hiring process satisfied strict scrutiny).
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 106 (amending section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). In the
context of physical strength and stamina tests, courts have upheld the use of different cutoffs for men
and women—for example, thirty push-ups for men but fourteen for women. See Bauer v. Lynch, 812
F.3d 340, 351 (4th Cir. 2016). This “gender norming” of physical tests has been justified on the basis
that “[m]en and women simply are not physiologically the same for the purposes of physical fitness
programs,” and the different cutoffs were “equally burdensome” for men and women. See id. at 349–51.
4. See Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: An Examination
of Ricci v. DeStefano, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 865, 891 (2013) (“Race-norming is prohibited [by section
2000e-2(l)] because it is a practice of grading people of different races according to different
standards.”); Chi. Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding
that altering scores to equalize the mean values for each racial group or adding ten points to each black
candidate’s score would be race-norming in violation of section 2000e-2(l) of Title VII).
5. See Dean, 438 F.3d at 462–63; see also Chi. Firefighters Local 2, 249 F.3d at 655–56.
6. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017).
7. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory, 93 TEX. L. REV. 415, 415
(2014) (book review) (“In American antidiscrimination theory, two positions have competed for
primacy. One, anticlassification, sees the proper goal of antidiscrimination law as being essentially
individualistic. . . . The other position, antisubordination, sees the proper goal of antidiscrimination law
as being more group oriented.” (footnote omitted)); see also Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification
Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 960–61 (2012) (exploring the tension
between antisubordination and anticlassification); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–14 (2003)
(challenging the “assumption that . . . the anticlassification principle triumphed over the
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decisions, including the statutory prohibition on race-norming tests and the
Court’s equal protection rulings, may not translate readily to the governance of
machine-assisted decisions. Legislators and jurists did not have in mind the possibility that powerful computing machines might be capable of formally removing
protected characteristics from consideration, yet still inescapably and inadvertently reproducing preexisting human biases by leveraging correlations.
The basic problem of unintentional algorithmic discrimination is by now wellrecognized.8 A recent Reuters report provides an example: Amazon used a secret
machine-learning algorithm in recruiting employees, and it systematically
favored men over women in scoring potential job candidates.9 Amazon gave up
on that project, but it, and other companies, continue to pursue algorithmic decision processes in personnel matters.10 Scholars worry that algorithmic decisions
will evade regulation under current disparate impact and disparate treatment doctrine.11 Machine-learning algorithms explore data to identify correlations with
antisubordination principle”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011) (noting that Supreme
Court Justices disagree on whether the Equal Protection Clause dictates antisubordination or
anticlassification).
8. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3 (2016) (many mathematical predictive models “encode[]
human prejudice, misunderstanding, and bias”); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674–75 (2016) (explaining that “data mining can reproduce
existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the
widespread biases that persist in society”); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1023, 1039 (2017) (explaining that automated algorithms present problems of “intentional invidious
discrimination” and “replicating real world inequalities”); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2014) (noting that
credit-scoring algorithms “systematiz[e] [discriminatory practices] in hidden ways” (footnote omitted));
James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE
164, 169 (2016) (noting one commentator’s argument that under the current constitutional order, data
mining is “permitted to exacerbate existing inequalities in difficult-to-counter ways”); Margaret Hu,
Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 662–63 (2017) (explaining that artificial intelligence
systems are “not immune to inherent racial biases” and that judgments from these algorithms might be
suspect); Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 190
(2017) (describing the “classification bias” of algorithms); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 680 (2017) (“A significant concern about automated
decisionmaking is that it may simultaneously systematize and conceal discrimination.”); Andrew D.
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 120–23 (2017) (providing examples
of unintentional discrimination by algorithms, including Google’s AdWords linking “‘black-sounding’
names to criminal records”).
9. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 11:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automationinsight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G
[https://perma.cc/B3JA-QX76].
10. See id. (reporting that Amazon has tasked a new group with developing artificial intelligence
techniques to improve diversity in hiring); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) (“Employers are increasingly relying on data analytic tools to
make personnel decisions, thereby affecting who gets interviewed, hired, or promoted.” (footnote
omitted)).
11. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 694–714; Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory
Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2018) (arguing that stereotyping theory could be effective in
regulating discriminatory algorithms); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 428–29
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some target characteristic (for example, a good employee). Due to this defining
feature, the structure of the algorithm itself may provide a business necessity
defense to disparate impact liability.12 And, because the algorithm is making predictions based on data—without any discriminatory animus or intent—an
employer relying on the algorithm may not be engaged in unlawful disparate
treatment.13
This perceived shortcoming of antidiscrimination law is prompting calls for
legal reform, including for modification of the business-necessity defense to disparate impact claims14 and creation of a regulatory agency to approve algorithms.15 Others propose technological cures to ensure fairness in algorithm
design.16 But, as we will see, algorithmic fairness cannot be accomplished just by
hiding protected characteristics from the machine. Attempting to build colorblind
algorithms is an exercise in futility. Machine-learning scholars increasingly agree
that the best way to get fair algorithmic results is not by hiding the protected trait,
but instead by using the protected trait to set a fairness constraint within the algorithm design.17 Machine-learning scholars are developing an arsenal of mathematical techniques to achieve fairness, some of which look like the algorithmic
equivalent of weighting employment tests differently by racial group.18 Professor
(2018) (noting that machine learning has exposed gaps in the Supreme Court’s categories of disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination).
12. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 709 (“Data mining will likely only be used if it is actually
predictive of something, so the business necessity defense solely comes down to whether the trait sought
is important enough to job performance to justify its use in any context.”). But see Kim, supra note 10, at
909–25 (arguing that a closer reading of Title VII’s statutory text reveals a possible theory beyond
disparate treatment and disparate impact that would “directly prohibit classification bias when
algorithms operate to systematically disadvantage protected groups”).
13. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 698 (“Except for masking [that is, the use of algorithms to
hide true, intentional discrimination], discriminatory data mining is by stipulation unintentional.”).
14. See Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 8, at 173–74 (using a hypothetical judicial opinion to
urge modification of the disparate impact business necessity defense to include a burden on the
defendant employer to explain why an algorithmic model works to predict success if the model’s results
correlate with protected characteristics).
15. See generally Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017).
16. “Fairness” is subject to multiple possible definitions, some of which are incompatible with each
other. See infra Section II.A; see also RICHARD BERK ET AL., FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RISK
ASSESSMENTS: THE STATE OF THE ART 3, 12–15 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9DDK-4EMJ] (“But, even when attempts are made to clarify what fairness can mean, there are
several different kinds that can conflict with one another and with accuracy.” (citation omitted)).
17. See generally CYNTHIA DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED CLASSIFIERS FOR FAIR AND EFFICIENT
MACHINE LEARNING 2 (2017) [hereinafter DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED CLASSIFIERS], https://arxiv.org/
abs/1707.06613 [https://perma.cc/2AYK-475J]; see also CYNTHIA DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH
AWARENESS 214 (2011) [hereinafter DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS], https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1104.3913.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHZ4-K9HN]; infra Section I.B (discussing algorithmic fairness).
18. See DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED CLASSIFIERS, supra note 17, at 2 (“Using sensitive attributes [in
the algorithm] may increase accuracy for all groups and may avoid biases where a classifier favors
members of a minority group that meet criteria optimized for a majority group . . . .”). Dwork suggests
training machine-learning classifiers separately for each group. See id. at 2; see also Dina Bass & Ellen
Huet, Researchers Combat Gender and Racial Bias in Artificial Intelligence, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 4,
2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/researchers-combat-gender-and-racialbias-in-artificial-intelligence/article37177350/ [https://perma.cc/2CMJ-4FV5] (“So for example, female
engineering applicants can be evaluated by the criteria best suited to predicting a successful female
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Anupam Chander has called for “algorithmic affirmative action,”19 arguing that
achieving fairness requires algorithms to take protected characteristics into
account and use them to counteract other unidentified sources of bias.20
Is algorithmic affirmative action legal? This question has two components:
(1) whether algorithmic affirmative action is consistent with statutory prohibitions
on intentional, disparate treatment discrimination; and (2) whether it is consistent
with the constitutional guarantee (where applicable) of equal protection. Data
scientists have noted the legal issues, but left them for legal scholarship.21 The
few legal scholars to confront such questions have disagreed about whether
Ricci v. DeStefano22—the Supreme Court’s 2009 opinion addressing tensions
between the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination––represents a legitimate threat to algorithmic fairness solutions.23 In Ricci,
the Court held that the City of New Haven’s refusal to certify firefighter promotion test results due to concerns about the racially disparate impact of the test
results constituted disparate treatment because of race.24 The limited scholarly
engineer and not be excluded because they don’t meet criteria that determine success for the larger
group.”); Kevin Hartnett, How to Force Our Machines to Play Fair, QUANTA MAG. (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.quantamagazine.org/making-algorithms-fair-an-interview-with-cynthia-dwork-20161123/#
[https://perma.cc/7WWF-442E]; Gal Yona, A Gentle Introduction to the Discussion on Algorithmic
Fairness, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/a-gentle-introduction-tothe-discussion-on-algorithmic-fairness-740bbb469b6 [https://perma.cc/DL29-ZFTV] (“The ‘aware’
approach . . . [could pick] up on the fact that learning Physics is a stronger signal for future success
among males than it is for females.”).
19. See Chander, supra note 8, at 1025 (“My central claim is this: if we believe that the real-world
facts, on which algorithms are trained and operate, are deeply suffused with invidious discrimination,
then our prescription to the problem of racist or sexist algorithms is algorithmic affirmative action.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Kroll et al., supra note 8, at 637 (arguing that ex ante technological
“fairness” solutions—possibly including “fair affirmative action”—embedded within the algorithm
structure are preferable to ex post solutions).
20. See Chander, supra note 8, at 1041 (“The counterintuitive result of affirmative action is that the
decisionmaker must take race and gender into account in order to ensure the fairness of the result.”).
21. See, e.g., BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 3 (“No effort is made here to translate formal definitions of
fairness into philosophical or jurisprudential notions in part because the authors of this paper lack the
expertise and in part because that multidisciplinary conversation is just beginning.” (citations omitted));
DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED CLASSIFIERS, supra note 17, at 2 (“[W]e consider how to use a sensitive attribute
such as gender or race to maximize fairness and accuracy, assuming that it is legal and ethical.”); Zachary C.
Lipton et al., Does Mitigating ML’s Impact Disparity Require Treatment Disparity 9 (Jan. 11, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.07076 [https://perma.cc/2JWT-9ZA6] (citing legal
scholars for the proposition that explicit treatment disparity may be legally tolerated).
22. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). The facts and holding of Ricci are outlined infra Section II.A.2.
23. Compare Kroll et al., supra note 8, at 692–95 (observing that Ricci may raise “legal difficulties
with correcting discriminatory algorithms ex post”), and Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 725–26
(noting that legislation requiring or enabling employers to audit algorithms for bias “may run afoul of
Ricci”), with Kim, supra note 8, at 197–202 (arguing that Kroll et al. misread Ricci, and that “nothing in
Ricci prohibits revising an algorithm after discovering that it has discriminatory effects”), Kim, supra
note 10, at 930–32 (arguing that Barocas & Selbst overstate the possibility that Ricci could be an
obstacle), and Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data
Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 131–32 (2017) (agreeing with Kim).
24. See 557 U.S. at 563 (holding that such “race-based action” would be justified only where the
employer had “a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable
under the disparate-impact statute”).
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discussion of Ricci in the context of machine learning has glossed over the
mechanics of race-aware algorithmic fairness solutions, as well as some important distinctions from the use of race by the City of New Haven. And beyond the
threat posed by Ricci, there remains an equal protection challenge to state actors’
use of race-aware fairness techniques to avoid algorithmic disparate impact.25
This Article is the first to comprehensively explore whether algorithmic affirmative action is lawful. It concludes that both statutory and constitutional antidiscrimination law leave room for race-aware affirmative action in the design of fair
algorithms. Along the way, the Article recommends some clarifications of current
doctrine and proposes the pursuit of formally race-neutral methods to achieve the
admittedly race-conscious goals of algorithmic affirmative action.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces algorithmic affirmative
action. It begins with a brief review of the bias problem in machine learning and
then identifies multiple design options for algorithmic fairness. These designs are
presented at a theoretical level, rather than in formal mathematical detail. It also
highlights some difficult truths that stakeholders, jurists, and legal scholars must
understand about accuracy and fairness trade-offs inherent in fairness solutions.
Part II turns to the legality of algorithmic affirmative action, beginning with the
statutory challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Part II argues that voluntary algorithmic affirmative action ought to survive a disparate treatment challenge under Ricci and under the antirace-norming provision of Title VII. Finally,
Part III considers the constitutional challenge to algorithmic affirmative action by
state actors. It concludes that at least some forms of algorithmic affirmative
action, to the extent they are racial classifications at all, ought to survive strict
scrutiny as narrowly tailored solutions designed to mitigate the effects of past
discrimination.
I. WHAT IS ALGORITHMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?
A. ALGORITHMIC BIAS

Machine-learning algorithms can improve efficiency in decisionmaking and
may help minimize some forms of subjective human biases. But they can also inadvertently reproduce existing bias, as Amazon’s experience illustrates. Amazon
wanted to more quickly and efficiently identify strong candidates for employment,
so it began using an “experimental hiring tool” that used a machine-learning algorithm to search the Internet and mechanically identify and rate potential job candidates.26 Machine-learning algorithms necessarily rely on past examples (the
training data) to identify correlations and patterns that are then exploited to

25. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594–95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. See Dastin, supra note 9; see also Jordan Weissmann, Amazon Created a Hiring Tool Using A.I.
It Immediately Started Discriminating Against Women, SLATE (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://slate.
com/business/2018/10/amazon-artificial-intelligence-hiring-discrimination-women.html [https://perma.
cc/PP2N-L8NM].
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make predictions or score candidates on target variables of interest.27 For example, an algorithm might be trained on past examples of good employees (who performed well by some quantifiable metric) and bad employees (who did not). Or
the algorithm may be trained on past examples of good credit risks (who missed
no more than x payments) and bad ones (who missed more than x payments).28 A
machine-learning algorithm can then explore everything known about those
examples, including all the variables or “features,”29 that are coded for each individual and identify patterns. It can then use those patterns—and the known variables for a new applicant—to predict whether that person will be a good employee
or a good credit risk.30
This automated process can remove some of the subjectivity and bias of human
decisionmaking, but it may also encode preexisting bias reflected in the information that the algorithm uses as examples. That is what happened in Amazon’s
experiment. “In effect, Amazon’s system taught itself that male candidates were
preferable. It penalized resumes that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess club captain.’ And it downgraded graduates of two all-women’s colleges . . . .”31 The algorithm was trained on data from employment applications
actually received by Amazon over a ten-year period, and most of those applications were received from men, reflecting a social phenomenon that men tend to
dominate employment in technology fields.32 After observing the disparities generated by its hiring tool, Amazon ultimately “lost hope for the project.”33
According to the report, Amazon still uses a “much-watered down version” of the
algorithmic tool, only to perform basic administrative sorting tasks like removing
duplicate candidate profiles.34
What happened with Amazon is only one illustration of how bias can creep
into algorithmic output. In an article widely cited in both the legal and machinelearning literature, Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst comprehensively describe
27. See Kim, supra note 10, at 874 (“In order to build a model, its creators must select the data that
they will use to build it—the ‘training data.’”); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 87, 89–91 (2014) (“Such algorithms are designed to detect patterns among data. In a typical
process, a machine learning algorithm is ‘trained’ to recognize[, for example,] spam emails by providing
the algorithm with known examples of spam for pattern analysis.”). This describes a “supervised”
machine-learning process, in which human modelers “must actively specify a target variable of
interest.” Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 678 n.24.
28. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 681 (describing the subjective nature of labeling a target
variable like creditworthiness).
29. See id. at 688 (noting that selecting which features to include in a model involves determining
“what attributes [organizations and their data miners] observe and subsequently fold into their
analyses”).
30. See id. at 677 (machine learning “automates the process of discovering useful patterns, revealing
regularities upon which subsequent decision making can rely”).
31. Dastin, supra note 9; see also Bornstein, supra note 11, at 521.
32. See Dastin, supra note 9. Note that this social phenomenon may be the product of individual
tastes and preferences, the product of potential applicants’ knowledge of discriminatory hiring patterns
of the particular employer or of the industry, or some combination of these. The true cause of the bias,
whether social tastes or past discriminatory practices, cannot be discerned from the data alone.
33. Id.
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the various ways that bias can be unintentionally introduced at different stages of
the machine-learning process.35 A basic understanding of these potential sources
of unintended bias is required before examining the proposed fairness solutions. I
briefly summarize below four critical vulnerabilities in the machine-learning process, but credit for the careful elucidation of these bias sources belongs to
Barocas, Selbst, and others who have added levels of technical detail on the
mechanics of machine-learning algorithms.36
1. Labeling Target Variables
First, discrimination can be the result of choices made when defining the target
variables for the algorithm. There is no single, objective definition of a “good”
employee or a “good” employment candidate, so the way the user defines and
assigns a specific value to the target variable, if correlated with a protected characteristic, could unintentionally trigger a disparate impact.37 For example, the
employer’s coding of a “good” employee can be subjective and track closely to
characteristics more heavily represented in the population of male employees
than female employees.
For the City of Springfield, constructing a machine-learning algorithm to identify those who would be “good” fire captains would begin by labeling past examples of good and bad captains. But how would the city identify and label which
prior captains had been good captains and which had not? Would labels be based
on the subjective ratings of each captain by the city’s fire chief? Would it be
based on some objective data about the performance of the firefighters under each
captain’s command? Would it be based on some other objective performance
data, such as average response times to emergencies by the stations and personnel
under the captain’s command? Labeling the target variable (the “good” fire captain) will be driven by what the employer values in a successful fire captain and
will necessarily be an exercise in human judgment. Because of that, the selection
and labeling of the target variable creates a vulnerability in the machine-learning
process that can lead to the reproduction of human bias.
35. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 677–93. Barocas and Selbst also discuss ways that
machine learning can be used to “mask” old-fashioned intentional discrimination by an organization or
decisionmaker. See id. at 692–93. If proven, such actions would trigger disparate treatment liability. For
purposes of this Article, I will set aside the potential for masking and focus only on unintended
discrimination. However, Barocas and Selbst highlight an important and interesting question about
whether an actor’s intentional use of an algorithm, having only knowledge that it leads to discriminatory
results, is sufficient to establish disparate treatment liability without a further showing that the actor
actually had an intent or motive to discriminate. See id. at 700–01. For the influence of Barocas and
Selbst in both the law and machine-learning literature, see Zachary C. Lipton et al., Does Mitigating
ML’s Impact Disparity Require Treatment Disparity? 14 (Mar. 2, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
http://zacklipton.com/media/papers/impact-disparity-treatment-disparity-lipton2018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6NNE-CTR5] (noting the article’s cross-disciplinary audience).
36. See, e.g., Lehr & Ohm, supra note 6, at 665–66 (crediting Barocas and Selbst for “being one of
the earliest to provide a detailed legal analysis of data mining,” and building upon that work with a more
detailed exploration of the stages of the machine-learning process).
37. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 679–80; see also Lehr & Ohm, supra note 6, at 703
(“[O]utcome variables can be disadvantageously defined . . . .”).
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2. Training Data: Encoding Preexisting Bias and Selection Bias
Second, the characteristics of the training data can lead to biased results in two
ways. If the training data include examples that are themselves tainted by discrimination or bias, then the algorithm will simply encode and reproduce that
bias.38 For example, if one feature in the algorithm is prior performance review
scores, and those performance reviews are subjectively scored by a human being
who discriminated against women (whether intentionally or not), then the algorithm’s output will likewise reproduce that discrimination against women.39
Barocas and Selbst illustrate the problem of biased training data with an oftcited real world example: the discriminatory admission of medical school applicants to St. George’s Hospital in the United Kingdom. Historically, the hospital
had systematically discriminated against minorities and women in considering
applicants. When prior admissions decisions were used as training data, the algorithm encoded and reproduced that discrimination when considering new applicants, thus perpetuating the preexisting human bias.40
Training data can also lead to discriminatory output if that training data are
drawn from a biased sample of the relevant population because certain types of
individuals are overrepresented or underrepresented in that training data.41 If, for
example, data are more readily available for men than women, or for younger
applicants than older applicants, the algorithm may unintentionally disfavor the
underrepresented group due to the data’s inaccurate reflection of the relevant population. The Amazon case illustrates one form of biased selection of training
data. Amazon trained its algorithm with data drawn from job applications that it
had actually received. Because women were significantly underrepresented in the
training data, the algorithm learned to disfavor women.

38. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 681–82; see also Lehr & Ohm, supra note 6, at 703 (“[D]
ata can have baked into them preexisting human biases . . . .”).
39. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 681–82; see also Dino Pedreschi et al., Discriminationaware Data Mining, in YING LI ET AL., KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING, KDD ’08:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY
AND DATA MINING 560, 560 (2008), http://pages.di.unipi.it/ruggieri/Papers/kdd2008.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5JRA-4KAL] (“[L]earning from historical data may mean to discover traditional prejudices that are
endemic in reality, and to assign to such practices the status of general rules, maybe unconsciously, as
these rules can be deeply hidden within a classifier.”); Richard Zemel et al., Learning Fair
Representations, 28 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 325, 325 (2013), https://www.cs.toronto.edu/
�toni/Papers/icml-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4YV-CMB3] (“Systems trained to make decisions
based on historical data will naturally inherit the past biases.”); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 397 (noting
how data used by artificial intelligence may incorporate prior conscious or unconscious human
discrimination in past performance reviews).
40. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 682.
41. See id. at 684–87 (“If a sample includes a disproportionate representation of a particular class
(more or less than its actual incidence in the overall population), the results of an analysis of that sample
may skew in favor of or against the over- or underrepresented class.”); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 6, at 703
(“[D]ata can be collected in a nonrepresentative manner . . . .”).
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3. Feature Selection
Third, machine-learning algorithms can unintentionally discriminate due to
feature selection.42 The features of an algorithm are the observed variables that
the algorithm has access to when seeking out correlations and patterns. The data
available to the algorithm can never fully capture all the unquantifiable complexities of the real world. The data set only captures what can be quantified and used
in mathematical calculations. As an example, Barocas and Selbst point to the use
of academic credentials in hiring.43 An algorithm may assign a particular numerical weight to the academic reputation of the school attended by a candidate, but
that choice of feature may systematically discriminate against certain groups.
Students from poorer backgrounds, for example, may attend prestigious
schools at lower rates for economic reasons, despite having similar academic
competence.
4. Proxies
Finally, algorithms unintentionally discriminate by identifying proxies. Even
where race, sex, or another protected characteristic is removed as a feature, making the algorithm theoretically unaware of that variable, the algorithm will often
track that variable through other closely correlated proxies. For example, street
address or neighborhood can often serve as a fairly reliable proxy for race.44 Job
tenure can serve as a proxy for gender because women who leave jobs for family
care reasons will decrease average job tenure for all women.45 Data scientists
have consistently identified such “redundant encoding” as one reason that fairness through blinding is ultimately ineffective.46 Removing race or sex as a variable for the machine does not prevent the machine from discovering and using
correlations based on proxies for race or sex, resulting in unintentionally discriminatory output.

42. See id. at 688–90; Kroll et al., supra note 8, at 681 (“Of particular concern are choices about
which data models should consider, a problem computer scientists call feature selection.”)
43. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 689.
44. See, e.g., id. at 712 (“Due to housing segregation, neighborhood is a good proxy for race and can
be used to redline candidates without reference to race.”); DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH
AWARENESS, supra note 17, at 23 (noting the redlining problem, or “the practice of arbitrarily denying or
limiting financial services to specific neighborhoods, generally because its residents are people of color
or are poor”); JOSHUA R. LOFTUS ET AL., CAUSAL REASONING FOR ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS 1–2 (2018),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.05859 [https://perma.cc/HU6E-GP6N] (noting that “knowledge of someone’s
address makes it easy to predict their race with relatively high accuracy”).
45. See Kroll et al., supra note 8, at 681 (“[W]omen who leave a job to have children lower the
average job tenure for all women, causing this metric to be a known proxy for gender in hiring
applications[].”).
46. See DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED CLASSIFIERS, supra note 17, at 1–2 (“Still speaking informally, it
is known that ‘ignoring’ these attributes [such as gender and race] does not ensure fairness, both because
they may be closely correlated with other features in the data and because they provide context for
understanding the rest of the data, permitting a classifier to incorporate information about cultural
differences between groups.” (citation omitted)).
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Professor Chander offers an illustration in the context of higher education
admissions.47 If a college admissions office wanted to choose applicants who
were likely to succeed in the job market after graduation, it could use a machinelearning algorithm designed to predict job market success. If whites fare better
than nonwhites in the job market, then the training data will reflect that fact and
the algorithm will reproduce the racial discrepancy by giving higher scores to
white applicants. Blinding the algorithm to race will not solve this problem. The
algorithm will use proxies—such as the applicants’ zip code or high school
attended—to score applicants in a way that favors whites. The race variable
becomes redundantly encoded in these proxies, still permitting the algorithm to
discriminate on the basis of race in scoring applicants.
B. ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS

Having described the problem of algorithmic bias, we turn to the technological
cure currently under development: algorithmic fairness. The Reuters report on
Amazon’s experimental hiring algorithm concludes by noting that a new team
has been assembled at Amazon to work on automated employment screening,
“this time with a focus on diversity.”48 This work may include attempts to incorporate a fairness constraint into the algorithmic process. The machine-learning
literature on fairness is quickly proliferating, with many creative ideas for adjusting or constraining machine-learning algorithms to counteract unintentional bias.
This section introduces the leading approaches.49
1. Fairness Through Blindness
The most obvious, though disfavored, approach to machine-learning fairness is
blinding the algorithm to any sensitive characteristics that are protected by antidiscrimination law, including race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;50 age;51
disability;52 or genetic information.53 To attempt this, data handlers simply omit
these variables from the data features provided to the machine-learning
algorithm.
At some level, this approach is intuitively appealing. It fits an idealized version
of pure anticlassification decisionmaking. It fits Chief Justice Roberts’s anticlassification rhetoric that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to

47. See Chander, supra note 8, at 1038–39.
48. Dastin, supra note 9.
49. Professor Stephanie Bornstein refers to these technological approaches as attempts to “improve
the algorithms,” as opposed to attempts to “improve the law.” Bornstein, supra note 11, at 533, 537.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
51. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(a)(1)–(2),
81 Stat. 602, 603, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
52. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat.
327, 331–32, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
53. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202(a),
122 Stat. 881, 907, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012). Notably, GINA does not provide a cause of action
for disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-7(a).
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stop discriminating on the basis of race.”54 And it fits with some salient success
stories in human decisionmaking. A famous example, cited often by Justice
Ginsburg in discussions about human biases, involves symphony orchestras dropping a curtain between the players auditioning for positions and the decisionmakers.55 The curtain blinded decisionmakers to gender, resulting in more
women successfully earning positions in symphony orchestras. A study of the
impact of blind orchestra auditions concluded that they substantially increased
the likelihood of orchestras selecting female candidates, explaining approximately one-third of the increase in female positions in major orchestras.56
Blinding algorithms to sensitive characteristics by removing variables like gender and race seems analogous to dropping a curtain between a symphony orchestra candidate and a human decisionmaker. Unfortunately, it doesn’t work the
same way. In the symphony context, humans need to be careful that no clues or
potential proxies are allowed to reach the decisionmaker. In addition to a curtain,
some symphonies use soft carpet flooring or ask candidates to remove their shoes
to hide the sound of footsteps that might reveal the candidate’s probable gender.57
That works for symphony auditions. But, as Amazon’s experiment illustrates,
machines are much better at detecting patterns, and at identifying and leveraging
on nonobvious proxies for omitted sensitive variables.58

54. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality
opinion).
55. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gillian Metzger & Abbe Gluck, A Conversation with Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 6, 18 (2013); The Robert L. Levine Distinguished
Lecture: A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Professor Aaron Saiger, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1497, 1508 (2017).
56. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2000); Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass
Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3–5 (2002) (describing Goldin and Rouse’s study).
57. See Ginsburg, Metzger & Gluck, supra note 55, at 18 (“When I mentioned the curtain last
summer . . . a star violinist, Jennifer Koh, told me, ‘You left out one thing. Not only is there a curtain but
we audition shoeless so they don’t hear a woman’s heels coming on stage.’”); Goldin & Rouse, supra
note 56, at 721; Jolls, supra note 56, at 3. Of course, there are many situations where human
decisionmaking processes cannot be completely blinded to race or sex. When reviewing human
decisionmaking that is not blinded, courts rely on a variety of burden-shifting proof frameworks to try to
discern from the evidence available (often indirect, circumstantial evidence) whether an adverse
employment decision was made “because of” the protected characteristic. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (systemic disparate treatment); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973) (individual disparate treatment); see also 42 U.S.
C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (primary operative provisions); id. § 2000e-2(m) (mixed motives). Nonetheless,
employers will often attempt to blind themselves to protected characteristics where possible to establish
a defense to any potential claim of discrimination. See generally Interviewing Candidates for
Employment, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-andsamples/toolkits/pages/interviewingcandidatesforemployment.aspx (“Questions relating either directly
or indirectly to age, sex, race, color, national origin, religion, genetics or disabilities should be avoided
entirely.”).
58. See, e.g., Yona, supra note 18 (“[R]emoving the protected attribute alone will often not suffice. In
most practical cases, the protected attribute is actually redundantly encoded in the rest of the observed
features; most [machine-learning] algorithms are complicated computational machine[s] that will be able
to pick up on and leverage this fact.”). Removing any variable that might be a potential proxy is also
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Machine-learning scholars appear to have reached a general consensus on this
point: attempting to blind an algorithm to a sensitive characteristic is usually ineffective.59 Sensitive features will indirectly affect the algorithm’s result because of
their relationship with other variables available to the algorithm. Computer scientists are trying to tell lawyers and judges that the way to stop machines from discriminating on the basis of race is not by trying to blind the algorithms to race,
but by recognizing the influence of unspecifiable sources of bias and implementing race-aware fairness solutions.
Unlike “fairness through blindness,” the other leading approaches to
algorithmic fairness all take protected characteristics into account in an
effort to achieve algorithmic fairness. The specific use of the sensitive characteristic varies, as discussed below, but each of the following fairness
approaches is aware of (that is, the algorithm has access to information
about) the sensitive variable and leverages that information to define and
attain some form of fairness. In that sense, each of the approaches detailed
in the remainder of this section might be described as a form of algorithmic
affirmative action. 60
problematic. See Kroll et al., supra note 8, at 681 (“Eliminating proxies can be difficult, because proxy
variables often contain other useful information that an analyst wishes the model to consider . . . .”).
59. See DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 22–23 (discussing the
redundant encoding problem facing fairness through blindness techniques); DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED
CLASSIFIERS, supra note 17, at 1–2 (“[I]t is known that ‘ignoring’ these attributes does not ensure
fairness . . . .”); MORITZ HARDT ET AL., EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN SUPERVISED LEARNING 1 (2016),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.02413 [https://perma.cc/63UY-WJ3K] (“A naı̈ve approach might require that
the algorithm should ignore all protected attributes . . . . However, this idea of ‘fairness through
unawareness’ is ineffective due to the existence of redundant encodings, ways of predicting protected
attributes from other features.”); Toshihiro Kamishima et al., Fairness-aware Learning Through
Regularization Approach, in IIEE COMPUT. SOC’Y, ICDMW ‘11: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 IEEE 11TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA MINING WORKSHOPS 643, 644 (2011), http://www.kamishima.
net/archive/2011-ws-icdm_padm.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5YG-RJRG] (“[S]imply removing sensitive
features is insufficient, and affirmative actions have to be adopted to correct the unfairness in machine
learning.”); MATT KUSNER ET AL., COUNTERFACTUAL FAIRNESS 2 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.
06856 [https://perma.cc/8SW8-A7EW] (“Despite its compelling simplicity, [fairness through unawareness]
has a clear shortcoming as elements of [the observed attributes] can contain discriminatory information
analogous to [the omitted protected characteristic] that may not be obvious at first.”); LOFTUS ET AL., supra
note 44, at 2 (“[I]t is . . . easy to accidentally create algorithms that make decisions without knowledge of a
persons [sic] race or gender, but still exhibit a racial or gender bias.”); Aditya Krishna Menon & Robert C.
Williamson, The Cost of Fairness in Binary Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 107, 107
(2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/menon18a/menon18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3UK-4NZ6] (“[M]
erely ignoring the sensitive feature is inadmissible, owing to it potentially being predictable by other
features”); Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 325 (“These [biases] may be ameliorated by attempting to make
the automated decision-maker blind to some [potential proxy] attributes. This however, is difficult, as many
attributes may be correlated with the protected one.”); Kroll et al., supra note 8, at 685 (“From a technical
perspective, however, this approach is naive. Blindness to a sensitive attribute has long been recognized as
an insufficient approach to making a process fair.”); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 691 (noting
the problem of redundant encodings even when “proscribed criteria have been removed from the dataset”);
Chander, supra note 8, at 1041 (“The obvious remedy to the problem . . . would seem to be to mandate race
or gender neutrality. In reality, however, . . . racial or sex neutrality would in fact perpetuate the problem of
algorithmic replication of existing racism.”).
60. Professor Chander may have meant to include even steps short of race-aware fairness constraints
in his use of the term “algorithmic affirmative action.” He writes: “Here, I mean ‘affirmative action’ in
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2. Group Fairness
Group fairness is a category of fairness definitions that attempts to measure
fairness by comparing the target variable outcomes of a machine-learning process
between two groups sorted along the sensitive variable. For example, a groupfairness approach might be interested in the percentage of white candidates predicted by the algorithm to be good employees versus the percentage of black candidates predicted to be good employees.
The simplest example of a group-fairness approach is a “demographic parity”
or “statistical parity” approach.61 At its most restrictive, this would require that
the predicted target variable success rates (good employee) be equal for both
groups. The most significant problem with this approach is that it leads to “highly
undesirable,” inaccurate predictions of future success.62 It forces the algorithm to
predict success for white and black candidates (or male and female candidates,
etc.) at exactly the same rate, regardless of whether that leads to accurate predictions of future success.63
A more relaxed version of demographic parity would allow some differences
in predicted success rates between the groups, but within some defined boundaries. This resembles the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC)
four-fifths rule of thumb for measuring potential disparate impact by comparing
differences in the selection rates produced by a particular employment practice.64
Under this version of parity, an algorithm might be required to produce a positive
prediction (good employee) at a rate for minority candidates that is no less than
four-fifths of the positive prediction rate for majority candidates. This approach
its broadest sense, as a set of proactive practices that recognize deficiencies in the equality of
opportunity and act in a multiplicity of ways to seek to correct for those deficiencies.” Chander, supra
note 8, at 1040–41. As examples, Chander includes the removal of variables suspected of being proxies
or of being tainted with encoded human bias. See id. at 1042–43; see also Yona, supra note 18 (“A quick
fix which is often used in practice is to also remove all the other attribute[s] that are highly correlated (e.
g [sic] above some threshold) with the protected attribute.”). My use of the term “algorithmic affirmative
action” is focused more narrowly on race-aware fairness constraints that arguably make classifications,
or at least adjust calculations, on the basis of race.
61. See BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 13; HARDT ET AL., supra note 59, at 1–2 (insisting that
demographic parity means that “membership in a protected class should have no correlation with the
decision”); Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 325 (“Group fairness, also known as statistical parity, ensures
that the overall proportion of members in a protected group receiving positive (negative) classifications
are identical to the proportion of the population as a whole.”).
62. See BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 13 (citing DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS
supra note 44).
63. See DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 215 (arguing that
statistical parity can lead to “blatantly unfair” results on an individual basis); HARDT ET AL., supra note
59, at 1–2 (positing that demographic parity does not ensure fairness and cripples utility of the
algorithm); Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 325 (“While statistical parity is an important property, it may
still lead to undesirable outcomes that are blatantly unfair to individuals, such as discriminating in
employment while maintaining statistical parity among candidates interviewed by deliberately choosing
unqualified members of the protected group to be interviewed in the expectation that they will fail.”).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018); see also MICHAEL FELDMAN ET AL., CERTIFYING AND
REMOVING DISPARATE IMPACT 2–3 (2015), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.3756 [https://perma.cc/PG6VJVLK] (proposing a measure of algorithm accuracy linked to the EEOC’s disparate impact four-fifths
rule, and a method for “repairing” data to remove disparate impact results).
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could, for example, build something like the EEOC’s four-fifths rule directly into
the algorithm’s optimization process.
Comparing selection rates for different groups is not the only possible way of
measuring fairness at a group level. Fairness can also be measured by comparing
false-positive rates (candidates who were predicted to be good employees but
ultimately turned out not to be) or false-negative rates (candidates who were predicted to be “bad employees” but ultimately turned out not to be).65 Another
slightly more complicated alternative involves the following inquiry: looking
only at those individuals for whom the algorithm predicted success (good
employees), what is the probability that those individuals will actually achieve
success? Are those probabilities the same or similar for each racial group?66 Or,
one could compare the ratio of false negatives to false positives for each group.
Are these ratios the same or similar?67 Still other possibilities for measuring
group fairness exist, though they are either advocated less often68 or satisfied only
under unrealistic, idealized conditions.69
The point is not to advocate for any particular measure of group fairness, but to
recognize that there are a host of ways to measure it, each of which requires
awareness of the protected characteristic and using it to impose some constraint
on the machine-learning algorithm. A related and important point is that these
measures of fairness cannot all be optimized at once.70 Setting demographic parity as a goal will mean that, in practice, false-positive or false-negative rates will
not be equal. Requiring equality of false-negative rates will mean that, in practice,
overall selection rates cannot be equal. There are inherent trade-offs in different
measures of group fairness.71
Optimizing for any particular measure of group fairness also involves a tradeoff with the algorithm’s accuracy.72 That is, applying a group fairness constraint
65. See BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 13–14 (using the more formal terminology “conditional
procedure accuracy equality” to describe this measure, and noting that Hardt uses the terms “equalized
odds” and “equality of opportunity” to describe similar, specific measures).
66. See id. at 14 (referring to this measure as “conditional use accuracy equality,” and noting that
some machine-learning scholars refer to this measure as “calibration”); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra
note 44, at 2–3 (comparing the formal definitions of the “equalized odds,” “calibration,” and
“demographic parity/disparate impact” measures of group fairness).
67. See BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 14–15 (referring to this measure as “treatment equality”).
68. See id. at 13 (referring to “overall accuracy equality” that measures the proportion of all
predictions that were correct—true positive and negative predictions, compared to the total number of
predictions—for each group, but noting that it is not often used because it treats false positives and false
negatives as equally undesirable).
69. See id. at 15 (referring to “total fairness,” which is satisfied only when all the foregoing measures
of accuracy are simultaneously met, a condition that “cannot be achieved” in practice).
70. See id.; Yona, supra note 18 (noting the zero-sum trade-offs between various measures of
fairness, and concluding that “it is ultimately up to the stakeholders to determine the tradeoffs”).
71. See BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 33–34 (“Except in stylized examples, there will be tradeoffs.
These are mathematical facts subject to formal proofs. Denying that these tradeoffs exist is not a
solution.” (citations omitted)).
72. See id. at 3 (“[E]ven when attempts are made to clarify what fairness can mean, there are several
different kinds that can conflict with one another and with accuracy.” (citation omitted)); Menon &
Williamson, supra note 59, at 107 (“There is typically an unavoidable tradeoff between how accurate
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necessarily requires some reduction in the overall accuracy of the algorithm’s
predictions, sometimes called a “price of fairness.”73 The reason is that any fairness constraint imposed by a modeler will prevent the algorithm from simply
maximizing accuracy based on all the features that would otherwise be available
to the algorithm.
3. Individual Fairness
Recognizing the shortcomings of group-fairness measures alone, some
machine-learning scholars advocate a fundamentally different approach called
individual fairness. The critical difference is that, instead of focusing on comparisons at the group level, individual fairness approaches measure disparities in treatment at the individual level for individuals with similar features. The basic
principle of individual fairness is: “any two individuals who are similar with
respect to a particular task should be classified [on the target variable] similarly.”74
Cynthia Dwork, a leading proponent of individual fairness metrics, is exploring ways to attain individual fairness, while also attempting to satisfy measures
of group fairness in some circumstances.75 Dwork suggests a metric to measure
the “distance” between any two individuals calculated based on their observed
nonsensitive features.76 Where this distance is small enough (that is, the two individuals are similar enough across the nonsensitive variables), then the algorithm
should predict the same target variable for the two individuals.77
As with the various definitions of group fairness, some challenges exist. First,
individual fairness approaches may not solve the redundant-encoding (proxy)
our classifier is with respect to the target feature, and how fair it is with respect to the sensitive
feature.”).
73. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, in
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH., KDD ’17: THE 23RD ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 797, 802 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.08230 [https://
perma.cc/5FUZ-7TYS] (considering the public safety price of criminal recidivism models constrained
for fairness).
74. DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 1 (emphasis omitted); see also
KUSNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 2 (defining individual fairness as “[a]n algorithm is fair if it gives
similar predictions to similar individuals”).
75. See Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 325 (describing Dwork’s line of work as “an ambitious
framework which attempts to achieve both group and individual fairness”); Hartnett, supra note 18;
Claire Cain Miller, Algorithms and Bias: Q. and A. With Cynthia Dwork, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/upshot/algorithms-and-bias-q-and-a-with-cynthia-dwork.html.
76. See DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 1 (“[A] task-specific
similarity metric describing the extent to which pairs of individuals should be regarded as similar for the
classification task at hand.”); FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 4; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 3–4.
Some observed, nonsensitive features that might be considered in the distance metric include years of
education, years of relevant experience, college major, prior job performance metrics, or other similar
variables.
77. See DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 1 (suggesting that the
similarity metric imposed could be set by a “regulatory body” or proposed “by a civil rights
organization”); LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 4 (quoting same). Coming up with an appropriate
distance metric is a significant challenge for this individual fairness approach. See KUSNER ET AL., supra
note 59, at 4070 (the distance metric “must be carefully chosen, requiring an understanding of the
domain at hand beyond black-box statistical modeling”); Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 326.

820

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 108:803

problem. If the similarity distance metric includes consideration of nonsensitive
features that correlate with the sensitive feature, then an algorithm could satisfy
individual fairness despite producing group bias by proxies.78 Second, although
ensuring individual fairness may tend to produce group fairness in some situations, under other conditions, individual fairness will not produce group fairness,
meaning that an individual fairness constraint can still produce disparate impacts
along the sensitive variable.79 Finally, as with any fairness constraint, there is
necessarily some trade-off between overall prediction accuracy and a completely
unconstrained algorithm. However, proponents of individual fairness argue that it
actually improves accuracy within all groups.80 That is, an algorithm optimized
to achieve individual fairness and that has access to the gender variable should be
better at predicting both whether a female candidate will be successful and
whether a male candidate will be successful, as compared to an algorithm that is
blinded to gender. The idea of improving intragroup accuracy by allowing the
algorithm to use sensitive variables (“fairness through awareness”) closely tracks
the City of Springfield’s hypothetical use of differential test score weights, discussed in the Article’s Introduction.
4. Causal Modeling and Counterfactual Fairness
Recently, some machine-learning scholars have argued that no measure of
group or individual fairness based solely on observational data will be satisfactory. These scholars propose fairness measures that are founded on causal modeling, which requires the analyst to have a theory about how the sensitive variable
interacts with the target variable and with other observed variables.81 Instead of
solely relying on data, this approach incorporates a theory about how the world
works.82 For an example of causal modeling, see Figure 1.83

78. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 4 (“[M]any variables vary along with protected attributes
such as race or gender, making it challenging to find a distance measure that will not allow some implicit
discrimination.”).
79. See DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 2 (describing the
conditions under which individual fairness will produce group fairness); Hartnett, supra note 18 (asking
Dwork, “What’s a situation where individual fairness wouldn’t be enough to ensure group fairness?,” to
which she replies, “If you have two groups that have very different characteristics. . . . If you have two
groups that have very different performance on standardized tests, then you won’t get group fairness if
you have one threshold for the standardized-test score”). Dwork discusses a possibility for implementing
“fair affirmative action,” by which statistical parity could be forced while still preserving as much
individual fairness as possible. See DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS, supra note 44, at 2,
11–15.
80. See DWORK ET AL., DECOUPLED CLASSIFIERS, supra note 17, at 2.
81. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 4 (“These [causal modeling] works depart from the previous
approaches in that they are not wholly data-driven but require additional knowledge of the structure of
the world, in the form of a causal model.”).
82. These approaches are predicated on the work of computer scientist Judea Pearl in formally
modeling the structure of causal relationships. See generally JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS,
REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2d ed. 2009).
83. Credit for the specific model presented in Figure 1 is due to Matt Kusner and coauthors Joshua
Loftus, Chris Russell, and Ricardo Silva. This model is reproduced with their permission.
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Figure 1

In Figure 1, directed arrows are used to show causal relationships between several observed variables (race, sex, undergraduate GPA (UGPA), LSAT score)
and a target variable (first-year law school grades (1LG)). In addition, a variable,
U, represents all other latent, unobserved characteristics of an individual (which
could include, for example, general knowledge of legal topics) that are assumed
not to be caused by any of the observed variables in the model. A directed arrow
indicates that a variable has some causal influence on another, with causation
flowing in the direction of the arrow. In this model, for example, the directed
arrows indicate that race has some causal influence on the values for the variables
undergraduate GPA and LSAT Score, and also on the target variable, first-year
grades.
Of course, there is no guarantee that this model is correct; it is just one possible
model of the causal relationships among the relevant variables. But having some
model of how the observed variables interact provides additional information that
can then be leveraged by analysts when seeking to measure algorithmic fairness.
In fact, machine-learning scholars advancing causal approaches to algorithmic
fairness argue that other measures of fairness include covariate adjustments that
“are often based on implicit causal reasoning”84—in other words, that other fairness techniques are driven by unstated, unexamined models of causal interactions
between the relevant variables.85 Advocates of causal approaches contend that it
is better to explicitly state the causal model assumptions and then design fairness
solutions accordingly.86

84. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 8.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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A prominent example of a causal approach to algorithmic fairness is “counterfactual fairness,” which posits that a predictor is fair toward an individual if it
gives the same prediction on the target variable in both the actual world and in
the counterfactual world where the individual’s sensitive group membership (for
example, race) is switched.87 For the model shown in Figure 1, an algorithmic
classifier might predict an individual’s first-year grades (and then admit or deny
admission accordingly) based only on the two features: undergraduate GPA and
LSAT. To determine whether this simple algorithmic classifier is counterfactually fair, the analyst would use all the known, observed variables, including the
sensitive variables (race, sex, UGPA, and LSAT score), combine all of that data
with the causal model depicted in Figure 1, and use that data to compute the
implied value of the unobserved variable U. Recall that in the causal model, U
simply represents all the latent, unobserved characteristics of an individual that
influence an individual’s undergraduate GPA, LSAT score, and first-year grades.
In the model, an individual’s U should remain the same regardless of race or sex.
Next, the analyst would switch the race variable (for example, from white to
black, its counterfactual value). Finally, the analyst would use the causal model,
the now-computed value for the individual’s U, and the new counterfactual race
variable to recompute all the remaining observed variable values (UGPA and
LSAT). If the classifier would reach the same prediction for first-year grades
based on the new, recomputed values for undergraduate GPA and LSAT score,
then it is counterfactually fair by this definition.88 This particular use of causal
modeling operates on an individual level,89 although there is a somewhat similar
approach that operates on a group level.90

87. See KUSNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 2 (“[W]e provide the formal definition of counterfactual
fairness, which enforces that a distribution over possible predictions for an individual should remain
unchanged in a world where an individual’s protected attributes had been different in a causal sense.”).
88. See id. at 8–9 (applying this definition of counterfactual fairness to a law school success problem
using the model shown in Figure 1). In implementation, the authors propose allowing slight variation in
the counterfactual predictions, up to a defined amount. See Matt J. Kusner, Counterfactual Fairness:
Matt Kusner, The Alan Turing Institute, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ZfuOw02U7hs (from 24:56–26:07 of the video). A further variation on this notion of counterfactual
fairness is to try to model and isolate “path specific” causal routes from the sensitive variable (for
example, race) to the target variable (here, predicted 1L GPA) and apply corrective measures only along
identified causal pathways that are deemed by the modeler be “unfair,” while not applying corrective
measures to any “fair” causal pathways from the sensitive variable to the target. See SILVIA CHIAPPA &
THOMAS P.S. GILLAM, PATH-SPECIFIC COUNTERFACTUAL FAIRNESS 1, 2 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1802.08139 [https://perma.cc/MQM5-NM4V]; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 15–18 (discussing pathspecific variations).
89. See KUSNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (“We also emphasize that counterfactual fairness is an
individual-level definition.”). Indeed, individual fairness through use of a distance metric as proposed by
Dwork is similar to matching up pairs of individuals who are quite similar except that they are differ on
the protected trait. Creating matched pairs is one way to get a sense of what to expect in the
counterfactual world (what one might expect from switching one person’s protected trait to its opposite).
90. See NIKI KILBERTUS ET AL., AVOIDING DISCRIMINATION THROUGH CAUSAL REASONING 656, 657
(2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.02744 [https://perma.cc/G2PU-8EW3] (“[O]ur work proposes a shift
from trying to find a single statistical fairness criterion to arguing about properties of the data and which
assumptions about the generating process are justified. Causality provides a flexible framework for
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The primary drawback to the counterfactual fairness approach is the need to
posit a causal model depicting a theory about how all the variables are interrelated.91 Advocates of causal reasoning approaches acknowledge this, but maintain that causal modeling is critical for algorithm fairness.92 For our purposes, it is
not necessary to determine whether causal fairness approaches are necessarily
superior to purely observational approaches. We need only note that, like the
group-fairness and individual-fairness approaches, causal approaches require
awareness of the sensitive characteristic to operate. Causal approaches will also
impose an accuracy price because requiring the algorithm to satisfy the counterfactual fairness constraint necessarily makes its predictions less accurate than an
unconstrained algorithm.93
5. Implementing Fairness Solutions
As the foregoing shows, machine-learning scholars are working on interesting,
complex, and creative ways to approach the fundamental problem of fairness in
machine-learning algorithms. The leading proposals all require some sort of protected-characteristic awareness adjustment at some point in the machinelearning stages to constrain or alter the output the algorithm otherwise would
have generated had it been completely unconstrained.
The means by which these fairness solutions are actually implemented in the
process varies. Possibilities include: preprocessing the training data (that is,
changing some of the data, removing some variables that correlate with the sensitive variable, or changing some predicted target values so that a fairness constraint is satisfied);94 imposing some kind of penalty for unfairness as the
machine learns patterns and optimizes its classification algorithm;95 or allowing

organizing such assumptions.”). Kusner describes the difference as follows: Kusner’s approach
compares the same individual with a different, counterfactual version of him/herself, while Kilbertus’s
approach compares different individuals with those who have the same or similar observed features. See
Kusner, supra note 88, at 17:28.
91. See KUSNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 7 (“[C]ausal models always require strong assumptions,
even more so when making counterfactual claims.”).
92. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 7–8 (“[W]hen choosing policies and designing systems that
will impact people, we should minimise or eliminate the causal dependence on factors outside an
individual’s control, such as their perceived race or where they were born. Since such factors have
influences on other aspects of peoples’ lives that may also be considered relevant for determining what
is fair, applying this intuitive notion of fairness requires careful causal modelling as we describe here.”).
93. See Kusner, supra note 88, at 22:48.
94. See generally BERK ET AL., supra note 16, at 25–29 (discussing preprocessing, inprocessing, and
postprocessing as potential solutions for group fairness issues); Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 325
(“Several papers . . . aim to achieve the first goal, group fairness, by adapting standard learning
approaches in novel ways, primarily through a form of fairness regularizer, or by re-labeling the training
data to achieve statistical parity.”); id. at 328–29 (giving an example of “massaging” the training data
labels by changing the values of some labels to remove the discrimination with the least possible
changes to the data).
95. See, e.g., Zemel et al., supra note 39, at 328–29 (discussing use of a regularizer during
optimization); Kusner, supra note 88, at 30:07.
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the machine to access the sensitive attributes while it is learns from the training
data, but later hiding them from the machine when it is makes new predictions.96
For purposes of antidiscrimination law, the method of implementation may
prove important. The time at which the fairness solution and the sensitive variable
are injected into the process could be relevant under current affirmative action
doctrine. And if courts are concerned about the optics of the process and potential
balkanization effects, then the transparency of the fairness solution and the ability
to identify the individuals who are advantaged or disadvantaged by the fairness
constraint could be important.
II. THE STATUTORY CHALLENGE TO ALGORITHMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
This Part turns from the design of algorithmic affirmative action to its legality.
Are race-aware algorithmic fairness solutions permissible under U.S. antidiscrimination law? In this Part, I will rely on the following hypothetical situation: an
employer covered by Title VII has delegated its hiring decisions to a machinelearning algorithm that is optimized to select good employees, but does so subject
to one of the race-aware fairness constraints described in Part I (either group fairness, individual fairness, or counterfactual fairness). The employer, during the
algorithm design process, has chosen to add the race-aware fairness constraint
out of concern that an unconstrained algorithm would produce racial disparities
disfavoring minorities. The employer’s concern is rooted in the literature on
machine learning, as well as the employer’s own initial testing of its algorithm
design on sample data. After the employer makes hiring decisions using the
fairness-constrained algorithm, an unsuccessful candidate sues the employer for
disparate treatment discrimination on the basis of race.
The starting point for our statutory analysis is the primary operative text for
disparate treatment discrimination, section 703(a):
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as

96. For criticism of this approach, sometimes called “disparate learning processes” (DLPs), see
Lipton et al., supra note 21 (manuscript at 2). Lipton argues that DLP approaches cannot solve the
redundant encoding problem, and that they can generate discrimination within groups that is based on
irrelevant features because the DLP attempts to implement treatment disparity using proxies. See id.
(manuscript at 2–3). Lipton concludes that a better trade-off between accuracy and fairness (parity) is
accomplished by transparently using the sensitive variable, rather than attempting to hide it from the
machine via a DLP. See id. (manuscript at 3).
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an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.97

The following sections will consider whether our employer’s use of a raceaware, fairness constraint in a hiring algorithm violates this statutory prohibition
on disparate treatment.
A. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE: IS ALGORITHMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AN ADVERSE ACTION
“BECAUSE OF” A PROTECTED CHARACTERISTIC?

First, our employer’s use of a race-aware, algorithmic fairness constraint likely
constitutes at least a prima facie instance of disparate treatment discrimination in
violation of section 703(a) of Title VII. Our employer uses a machine-learning
algorithm as part of its hiring selection process, and that algorithm includes a
race-aware fairness constraint. An unsuccessful candidate will allege that by
using the race-aware fairness constraint the employer has “fail[ed] or refuse[d] to
hire” her “because of” her race, or that the employer “classif[ied]” her in a way
that deprived her of employment opportunity, in violation of section 703(a).98
1. Discriminatory Motive or Intent
In cases involving human decisions the Supreme Court has sharply divided
Title VII violations into two categories, disparate treatment and disparate
impact.99 The Court emphasizes that, unlike disparate impact, a disparate treatment violation requires “‘intent’ or ‘motive’ (the terms are often used
interchangeably).”100 This emphasis on “intent” or “motive” presents some interpretive challenges when moving from human decisions to machine decisions.
Professor Charles Sullivan imagines a machine that runs amok by making its outcome predictions about who would be a good employee solely on the basis of
race or gender because (in his illustration) those features happen to correlate with
the target variable.101 Even in this scenario, it is not clear that an employer’s reliance on the machine’s output would necessarily trigger disparate treatment liability under the Court’s Title VII precedents.102 How can a computer act with
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). In its mixed motive provisions, Title VII further provides that an
unlawful employment practice is established if plaintiff demonstrates that a protected characteristic
“was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m). A separate provision limits the plaintiff’s remedies in a mixed motives case
if the employer can demonstrate that it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor.” Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). This lower mixed motive standard is
unavailable in age discrimination cases under the ADEA, where plaintiffs must show that age was a
“but-for” cause of the adverse action. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
99. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 405.
100. Id. at 404–05 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 402–10 (considering artificial intelligence that is “going rogue” by classifying based on
protected characteristics).
102. See id. at 405–06. Sullivan suggests that a more careful reading of the statute, apart from the
Supreme Court’s “bifurcated structure” (disparate treatment versus disparate impact) in the human
decision context, should indicate liability under these circumstances for “failing or refusing to hire” or
for “classifying them in a way that would deprive them of employment opportunities.” Id. at 408.
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discriminatory intent or motive when it only identifies correlations with a target
variable and acts upon them? How can an employer have discriminatory intent or
motive when it relies entirely on the computer’s data-driven predictions?
With algorithmic affirmative action, however, there is an identifiable human
component to the employer’s practice that is lacking in Professor Sullivan’s hypothetical. Professor Sullivan proposed turning the hiring decisions over to an
algorithm with the sole task of identifying good employees.103 The algorithmic
affirmative action hypothetical I set forth above involves a different, more complex instruction. By definition, incorporation of any race-aware, fairness solution
means instructing the computer to pick good employees, subject to this defined
fairness constraint. If an employer or its algorithm designer—a human, not a
machine—instructs the computer to follow a race-aware fairness constraint, then
it is presumably acting with sufficient intent to trigger disparate treatment protections, even under the Court’s human decision precedents. The human instruction
to follow a race-aware fairness constraint intentionally injects a protected characteristic into the computer’s programming in a way that simply asking the computer to find good employees––even with access to sensitive variables––does not.
2. Ricci v. DeStefano and Discriminatory Intent
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano104 bolsters the conclusion
that courts would find sufficient discriminatory intent to support a disparate treatment claim where an employer directed the use of a race-aware fairness constraint. Ricci’s analysis of the tension between disparate treatment and disparate
impact in the context of human decisions makes it a critical case for scholars who
are considering how to respond to algorithmic disparate impacts.105
In Ricci, the City of New Haven, Connecticut’s fire department administered
objective examinations (part written, part oral) to identify the best candidates for
promotion to lieutenant and captain.106 The tests would determine who would be
eligible for those promotions for two years, and many candidates “studied for
months, at considerable personal and financial cost.”107 The tests were developed
by a third-party contractor that took steps to ensure that the test results would not
inadvertently discriminate against minority candidates. For example, in conducting interviews to prepare a job analysis, the contractor oversampled minority firefighters.108 The contractor also ensured that, for the oral portion of the

Barocas and Selbst explore some possible arguments for application of disparate treatment doctrine to
discriminatory output of data mining but conclude that “disparate treatment doctrine does not appear to
do much to regulate discriminatory data mining.” See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 699–701.
103. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 395 (“It gives the computer only one instruction: ‘Pick good
employees.’”).
104. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
105. See supra note 23.
106. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562, 564.
107. Id. at 562.
108. See id. at 565.
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examination, each three-member panel of assessors included two minority
members.109
After the city obtained the test results, it grew “concern[ed] that the tests had
discriminated against minority candidates.”110 Most of the firefighters eligible for
immediate promotion based on the test results were white.111 After a protracted
public debate about whether to certify the test results and proceed with the promotion procedure, the city’s civil service board ultimately refused to certify the
results of the tests.112
Several of the firefighters––who passed the examinations and might have
received promotions had the tests been certified—sued the city alleged disparate
treatment in violation of section 703(a) of Title VII and in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 The city argued that its attempt
to comply with Title VII’s disparate impact provisions could not be the basis for
finding a disparate treatment violation. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of the city, in part because the city’s “motivation to avoid
making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact . . . does not, as
a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent” necessary to support a disparate
treatment violation of Title VII.114 The Court of Appeals agreed.115 The Supreme
Court not only reversed the summary judgment in favor of the city, but it also went
on to direct summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their Title VII claim.116 It
held that the city’s refusal to certify the tests constituted disparate treatment in violation of Title VII because the city lacked a “strong basis in evidence to believe it
would face disparate impact liability if it had certified the examination results.”117
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court considered whether the city had
sufficient discriminatory intent to support a section 703(a) disparate treatment
violation when the city’s motivation was not to discriminate against minorities,
but instead to avoid disparate impact liability under Title VII.118 The Court had
no problem finding that the city’s refusal to certify the test results constituted sufficient intent to establish a section 703(a) disparate treatment violation given its
knowledge of the racial disparities that the test had produced.119 It wrote:

109. See id. at 565–66.
110. Id. at 566.
111. The top ten scores on the lieutenant test were eligible for immediate promotion to one of eight
open lieutenant positions. All ten were white. The top nine scores on the captain test were eligible for
immediate promotion to one of seven open captain positions. Of those nine, seven were white and two
were Hispanic. See id. at 566.
112. The civil service board vote was two to two, with one member recused. As a result, the board
did not certify the tests. See id. at 574.
113. See id. at 574–75.
114. See id. at 576 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006)).
115. See id. at 576 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 264 F. App’x. 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), opinion
withdrawn and superseded by 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008)).
116. See id. at 593. The Court declined to resolve the equal protection question. See id.
117. Id. at 592.
118. See id. at 579–80.
119. See id.
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But both of those statements [about intent by the District Court and by the
United States government by amicus] turn upon the City’s objective—avoiding disparate-impact liability—while ignoring the City’s conduct in the name
of reaching that objective. Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well
intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely because
the higher scoring candidates were white. The question is not whether that conduct was discriminatory but whether the City had a lawful justification for its
race-based action.120

The Court’s Title VII analysis therefore started with the premise that the city’s
action’s violated section 703(a)’s prohibition on disparate treatment because,
absent some legal justification or defense, “this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.”121
Applying Ricci’s logic to our algorithmic affirmative action hypothetical, the
necessary intent for a section 703(a) disparate treatment claim exists. Our
employer’s decision to use a race-aware fairness constraint has the benevolent
objective of avoiding algorithmic results that produce a disparate impact on racial
minorities. Yet, the employer’s conduct in deploying a race-aware fairness constraint would likely be viewed as “race-based action,” like the city’s refusal to
certify test results, because it injects consideration of race into the hiring
decision.
One might try to distinguish Ricci by arguing that the employer’s action there
was based solely on race, while the decision to hire or reject a candidate based on
the output of a race-aware algorithm would not be solely because of race.122 Race
would be only one of many variables considered by our employer’s algorithm.
But, Title VII’s causation standard does not require that race be the sole reason
for an action; it requires only either “but-for” causation or “motivating factor”
causation.123 As discussed in the following section, race could be shown to be a
but-for cause of some candidate rejections, which is enough to sustain a disparate
treatment violation under any of the major antidiscrimination statutes.124
3. “But-For” Causation
If a human instruction to introduce a race-aware fairness constraint does constitute a sufficient motive or intent for disparate treatment purposes, then the next
step of the analysis is to determine whether there is a sufficient causal link
between the protected characteristic and the adverse employment action. For
120. Id.
121. Id. at 579.
122. See supra text accompanying note 118.
123. See supra note 97; see also Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.
J. 1106, 1137–41 (2018) (distinguishing a but-for motive standard from a “sole” motive standard).
124. For Title VII violations, a plaintiff need only show that race was one motivating factor among
several possible motivating factors for the adverse employment action to trigger liability. See supra note
97. In contrast, the ADEA requires a showing of but-for causation. See supra note 97.
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Title VII, the prohibited characteristic need only be a motivating factor to trigger
liability, but, under the ADEA, age must be a but-for cause of the adverse
action.125 Even the more demanding but-for causation requirement will not thwart
a statutory challenge to algorithmic affirmative action.
To show but-for causation, a plaintiff alleging discrimination needs to demonstrate that she would not have suffered the adverse employment action but for the
employer’s consideration of the protected characteristic.126 In our hypothetical,
the adverse action is a failure to hire, based on the results of a machine-learning
algorithm that includes a race-aware fairness constraint. A plaintiff could establish but-for causation by showing that she would have been hired had it not been
for consideration of her race.
This required showing of but-for causation might prove challenging for realworld litigants, but in theory it should not be difficult at all. If a disappointed
candidate in our example can get access (presumably through civil litigation discovery) to the employer’s algorithm program, the underlying training data, and
the data upon which the algorithm based its predictions, the candidate would
have all the tools necessary to determine whether the race-aware fairness constraint was decisive. The race-aware fairness constraint could be temporarily
removed from the computer’s optimization program. Programmers can delete the
fairness constraint instructions and leave the program with only one optimization
instruction: “pick good employees.”127 Then the results for any individual candidate could be directly compared, with and without the fairness constraint. A
plaintiff might have been classified as “bad employee—don’t hire” using an algorithm with the race-aware fairness constraint, but classified as “good employee—
hire” using the same algorithm without the fairness constraint. If so, the plaintiff
would have an unusually strong case that the race-aware fairness constraint was a
but-for cause of the adverse employment action.
In practice, information asymmetries typical for failure-to-hire or failure-topromote cases are at work.128 Disappointed candidates will not have much
detailed information about the reasons they were not selected. They will not have
access to information about the hiring algorithm source code, the training data, or
the applicant pool data—all of which are in the possession of the employer. They
likely will not be able to obtain this information prior to civil litigation discovery.
125. See supra note 97.
126. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013) (citing multiple
authorities on tort law for the proposition that “[i]n the usual course, this standard [causation in fact]
requires the plaintiff to show ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but
for—the defendant’s conduct”); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009).
127. This could be done by “commenting out” the part of the computer code that implements the
fairness constraint, which would convert that portion of code from an instruction to a comment that the
computer ignores. Skype Interview with Matt Kusner, Associate Professor, Univ. Coll. London (Oct. 16,
2018) (on file with author).
128. See Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 222 nn.37–38 (discussing information asymmetries in employment discrimination
cases, where plaintiff typically “lacks information in the defendant’s possession that may be vital to the
proof of his case”).
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Nonetheless, if a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss and obtain discovery
about the hiring process, a strong showing of but-for causation appears quite
possible.
The but-for causation standard, much less the more lenient motivating factor
standard, is unlikely to stand in the way of a prima facie showing of disparate
treatment in our hypothetical. A court’s analysis of algorithmic affirmative
action, therefore, will likely begin with the same starting premise as the Ricci
Court’s analysis: the employer’s race-based conduct, however benevolent its
objective, will violate section 703(a) absent some legal justification or defense
for it.129
B. THE “STRONG-BASIS-IN-EVIDENCE” JUSTIFICATION

One possible legal justification for the employer’s conduct is the one
announced in Ricci: the employer’s strong basis in evidence for believing that it
would be subject to disparate impact liability in the absence of the race-based
conduct.130 The Court adopted this standard in the context of Title VII to resolve
any tensions between the statutory disparate impact framework and the disparate
treatment framework.131
An employer using a race-aware fairness constraint in a machine-learning
algorithm would likely argue that the fairness constraint is necessary to prevent
the algorithm from producing a disparate impact violation of Title VII. At least
one proposed variant of a race-aware group fairness constraint directly incorporates the mathematics of the EEOC’s four-fifths rule to determine whether a disparity exists in the data accessible to an algorithm, and then recommends
“repairing” the “biased” data in a way that removes that disparity.132
One difficulty with this justification is that Ricci requires employers to consider
not only the prima facie showing of statistical disparities, but also the employer’s
potential defenses to a disparate impact claim. In Ricci, the statistical disparities
were significant, and the city was therefore “compelled to take a hard look at the
examinations to determine whether certifying the results would have had an
impermissible disparate impact.”133 But the city was obligated to consider its
defenses, too. The city would be liable only if the tests “were not job related and
consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, lessdiscriminatory alternative that served the City’s needs but that the City refused to

129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009). The Court borrowed this standard from its equal
protection jurisprudence in cases involving race-based governmental action to remedy past
discrimination. See id. at 582–84.
131. See id. at 584.
132. See FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 64. The “repair” procedure is a variant of data preprocessing
and looks somewhat like the type of norming that would be a violation of section 703(l) if performed on
employment-related tests scores. The modeler would change or remove any attributes in the data set that
could be used to predict whether a person was in the minority group. See id. at 6, 11, 13 (describing and
illustrating the proposed “repair” procedures).
133. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587.
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adopt.”134 The Court found no genuine issue of material fact on these points; the
city lacked a strong basis in evidence for believing that the tests were not jobrelated or that there was a less discriminatory alternative.135
In our hypothetical, an employer has adopted a race-aware fairness constraint
in order to prevent expected disparate impact from an unconstrained algorithm.
But, even if we assume that statistically significant disparities would be produced
by the unconstrained algorithm, Ricci requires an employer to consider its business necessity defense: is the unconstrained algorithm job-related and consistent
with business necessity? We are now back to the question, addressed in some of
the legal literature on algorithms, whether existing disparate impact doctrine can
effectively police machine-learning algorithms that produce discriminatory
results. Many scholars think not, believing that a machine-learning algorithm
designed to identify correlations with a target variable like “good employee” is,
maybe by definition, job-related and consistent with business necessity.136 This
possibility prompted Professors Grimmelmann and Westreich to propose a modification to (or perhaps a clarification of) the business necessity defense to require
that the employer provide an understandable explanation for the machine’s decision.137 Although this issue is far from resolved in the courts, there is at least a
viable argument that an algorithm designed to uncover nonobvious variables correlating with being a good employee is job-related and consistent with business
necessity. If so, then our hypothetical employer, like the City of New Haven in
Ricci, has a viable defense to disparate impact liability, thereby precluding it
from engaging in race-based conduct to avoid statistical disparities.
The strong-basis-in-evidence test might also be met, thus permitting the
employer to implement the race-aware fairness constraint, if a disappointed candidate under an unconstrained algorithm could point to a less discriminatory alternative practice that would still meet the employer’s needs, but that the employer

134. Id. This proof framework for disparate impact was set out in the 1991 amendments to Title VII
and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
135. See id. at 587–92.
136. See supra note 12.
137. See Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 8, at 171–74; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note
8, at 708–09 (“Data mining will likely only be used if it is actually predictive of something, so the
business necessity defense solely comes down to whether the trait sought is important enough to job
performance to justify its use in any context.”); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 411 (“There is yet another
reason why disparate impact will not resolve the problem of Rogue Arti: as hypothesized, the gender
exclusion seems to be justified by business necessity and therefore is not illegal.”). Our employer may
be lacking a strong basis in evidence for believing there is a disparate impact violation for a second
reason—the algorithm may be classifying on the basis of a protected characteristic to make its
predictions, and therefore may be “facially discriminatory”—and subject only to disparate treatment
theory—rather than “facially neutral”—the domain of disparate impact theory. See id. at 410–11. But
see Allan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 555, 571 (2016) (arguing that a simple correlation with a target variable is not sufficient
to satisfy disparate impact’s job-relatedness requirement, and if it were, then the defense would reduce
to a tautology).
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refused to adopt.138 The simplest alternative employment practice to an unconstrained algorithm—attempting to blind the algorithm to the sensitive variable—
will often produce an outcome that is just as discriminatory as the unconstrained
algorithm, as explained above.139 And, one problem with race-aware fairness
alternatives to an unconstrained algorithm is that they will necessarily involve
some trade-off with accuracy. Measured by overall accuracy of predictions, an
algorithm instructed only to identify good employees will beat an algorithm
instructed to identify good employees subject to a fairness constraint, because of
the necessary trade-off with accuracy.140 Arguably, a less accurate predictor is
not “equally valid” and may not serve the employer’s need to identify good
employees as well as the unconstrained predictor.141
Because of the likely business necessity defense to a disparate impact claim,
our hypothetical employer is probably in the same boat as the City of New Haven
in Ricci. It likely lacks a strong basis in evidence for believing that it would face
disparate impact liability if it refused to implement its race-aware fairness constraint. On this reading of the business necessity defense, our search for a lawful
justification will need to continue.
C. RICCI’S “AMPLE ROOM” FOR VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE VII

Even if algorithmic affirmative action might not be justified under the strongbasis-in-evidence test, it might be justified under other language found in Ricci’s
dicta that protects certain acts of voluntary Title VII compliance. The Ricci Court
emphasized the importance of voluntary compliance as integral to Title VII’s
statutory scheme and clarified that its ruling left “ample room” for employers’
voluntary compliance efforts.142 In an enigmatic portion of the Ricci opinion
potentially relevant to algorithmic fairness, the Court wrote:
Nor do we question an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups
have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the process by which promotions will be made. But once that process has been established and employers have made clear their selection criteria, they may not
then invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race. . . .

138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (C) (2012) (returning the law on “alternative employment
practice[s]” in disparate impact cases to its state before Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989)); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 589–92 (finding no evidence of an available “equally valid, lessdiscriminatory” alternative employment practice).
139. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
141. Cf. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587, 589 (providing no evidence that changing the test weighting of
written and oral components from 60/40 to 30/70 would be “an equally valid way to determine whether
candidates possess the proper mix of job knowledge and situational skills”).
142. Id. at 583 (“The [strong-basis-in-evidence] standard leaves ample room for employers’
voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to Congress’ efforts to
eradicate workplace discrimination.”).

2020]

IS ALGORITHMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LEGAL?

833

Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a
fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race. And when, during
the test-design stage, an employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair,
that process can provide a common ground for open discussions toward that
end.143

Professor Pauline Kim rightly notes that this language would allow an
employer who has detected bias in its algorithm to voluntarily cease using it.144
The City of New Haven was required to certify the test results once firefighters
had relied on the process, but there was nothing requiring the city to continue
using that test format in making promotions in the future.145
This observation is true as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go far enough to legally
justify race-aware fairness constraints. There is a significant difference between
discarding a biased algorithm and fixing a biased algorithm by introducing a
race-aware fairness constraint. That difference is the employer’s affirmative use
of race to calculate mathematical fairness constraints within an algorithm used to
make hiring decisions, which will necessarily result in adverse employment
actions.
Critiquing Barocas and Selbst’s observation that Ricci might present a roadblock to employer responses to biased algorithms, Professor Kim writes:
Title VII does not forbid any employer decision just because it is made with an
awareness of race. Instead, it forbids “adverse employment actions” taken
“because of an individual’s race.” Unlike . . . Ricci, prohibiting the use of a biased algorithm does not constitute a disparate treatment violation because
there has been no adverse employment action. No employee has been deprived
of a job to which he is entitled because no employee has any right or legitimate
expectation that an employer will use any particular model.146

She goes on to observe that “[m]erely being aware of the racial consequences
of a selection process” is not a disparate treatment violation.147 Therefore, an
employer’s attempt to identify, understand, and avoid any racial disparate impact
produced by a selection process is not a violation. In Ricci, for example, if during
143. Id. at 585.
144. Kim, supra note 10, at 931–32.
145. Id. at 932. There is an interesting ambiguity lurking in this dichotomy. Of course, the City of
New Haven was not required to certify the test results and then to continue using those scores for
promotions in perpetuity. On the other hand, it seems fair to infer that the city might not be able to
discard the results after filling only the immediately open positions. The record indicates that the test
results would be used in making promotion decisions for the next two years, and the candidates no doubt
relied on that understanding when studying for the high-stakes test. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562.
146. Kim, supra note 10, at 930 (footnote omitted) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012)). Kim notes that an applicant who might have been hired under a biased
algorithm but was not because the employer discarded the model is in a meaningfully different position
from a firefighter who studied in reliance on an announced testing process. See id.
147. Id. at 931.
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the test design phase and prior to announcing the test process, the city had discovered that using a 30/70 weighting (written to oral components) rather than its
planned 40/60 weighting would have produced equally valid results with less
likelihood for disparate impact, then switching to 30/70 weighting would not constitute disparate treatment.148 Importantly, though, that sort of action by the city
would be a race-aware but race-neutral voluntary fix to the test design.149
Beyond simply discarding a biased algorithm, Professor Kim does not consider
ways that an employer might try to fix an algorithm to remove the bias.150 If the
employer’s fix is a race-neutral attempt to blind the algorithm to sensitive variables, it will likely be ineffective.151 If the employer’s fix is to implement a raceaware fairness constraint, then individual disappointed candidates will likely
have a prima facie case that they suffered an adverse employment action because
of the individual’s race.152
The voluntary compliance efforts cited by the Ricci Court and Professor Kim
are distinguishable from the situation facing our hypothetical employer.
Although Ricci’s dicta described “ample room” for employers to design and
revise selection procedures in race-neutral ways with a race-aware goal of
enhancing diversity or avoiding disparate impact, that “ample room” may not
encompass voluntary efforts by an employer that include race-based methods.
This poses an interesting question with importance for the constitutional equal
protection issue: whether a race-aware fairness constraint is race based, as
the Court described the City of New Haven’s conduct, or is instead race
148. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585; see also supra note 141 (considering 30/70 weighting as a possible
alternative employment practice in Ricci). A race-based differential weighting (for example, 30/70 only
for minorities, but 60/40 for whites) would presumably have been disapproved by the Ricci Court, given
section 703(l).
149. Whether a race-aware fairness constraint is a racial “classification,” for constitutional purposes,
or is instead a formally race-neutral measure is explored in section III.A. See Reva B. Siegel, RaceConscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 653, 655–56 (2015) (noting the Court’s apparent approval of race-conscious attempts to
improve diversity so long as they are implemented in a formally race-neutral way, such as the State of
Texas’s “top ten percent” plan that provides automatic admission for any student finishing in the top ten
percent of his or her class, regardless of race).
150. See Kim, supra note 10, at 928–32.
151. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (operative disparate treatment text); supra Section II.A (prima facie
case); cf. supra text accompanying note 144. Group fairness approaches might fare better than
individual fairness approaches under the “ample room” language from Ricci. An employer could argue
that an algorithm using a group fairness constraint, such as the four-fifths selection rate rule, is
analogous to: (1) applying a race-neutral selection technique; (2) checking the results against the fourfifths rule; (3) rejecting the technique if it fails that rule; (4) selecting the next-best race-neutral selection
technique; and then using computational power to continually repeat that four-step process rapidly until
it finds a selection technique that satisfies the fairness constraint. This analogy, however, could easily
open the door to comparisons to quota systems. See generally infra note 236 and accompanying text
(noting the Supreme Court’s distinction between the “flexible” and “nonmechanical” use of race in
higher education admissions programs and the impermissible use of quota systems). Individual fairness
approaches, including counterfactual fairness, are not as readily analogized to the four-step process
described above because they incorporate sex or race directly into the computations, at the individual
level, as part of the fairness constraint.
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neutral.153 Certainly, the Ricci Court did not cite an example of conduct akin to
race-aware algorithmic fairness constraints that would fit within the “ample
room” for voluntary compliance. Ricci’s dicta, by itself, does not seem to provide
statutory justification for race-aware fairness constraints.
D. THE VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JUSTIFICATION UNDER TITLE VII

The final, and most promising, legal justification for our hypothetical employer’s use of a race-aware fairness constraint is permissible voluntary affirmative
action. This section contends that current Title VII affirmative action doctrine already permits some uses of race-aware algorithmic fairness constraints, and that a
clarification or modification to update the doctrine could justify algorithmic affirmative action more broadly.
Title VII permits employers to engage in voluntary race-based affirmative
action pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan.154 Where an employer acts pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan, it serves as the employer’s legitimate
“nondiscriminatory rationale” for a challenged employment action.155 The
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Transportation Agency applied the McDonnell
Douglas framework as follows:
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken
into account in an employer’s employment decision, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is
articulated as the basis for the employer’s decision, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer’s justification is pretextual and the plan is
invalid.156

A plaintiff challenging our hypothetical employer’s use of a race-aware fairness constraint would have no difficulty establishing a prima facie case that race
has been taken into account in the employer’s employment decision.157 The inclusion of a race-aware fairness constraint in a hiring algorithm would, by definition,
establish that.
At this point, our employer could point to an “affirmative action plan” to justify
its use of race in the algorithmic hiring process, which would place the burden on
the plaintiff to show that the plan was invalid. An initial question, though, is
whether use of a race-aware fairness constraint in a machine-learning algorithm
is really an affirmative action plan at all. The Supreme Court’s decisions in
153. See infra Section III.A.
154. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987) (Title VII not violated where
employer took sex into account as part of a valid affirmative action plan featuring “a moderate, flexible,
case-by-case approach” to improving minority and female representation in certain jobs); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (Title VII “does not condemn all private, voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action plans.”).
155. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
156. Id.
157. See supra Section II.A.
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Johnson and Weber establishing this defense do not define the term “affirmative
action plan.”158 A related question is whether there is any daylight between a voluntary affirmative action plan governed by Weber and Johnson and the sort of
voluntary employer conduct governed by Ricci’s strong-basis-in-evidence standard. The Ricci Court did not evaluate the city of New Haven’s refusal to certify
test results under the Weber and Johnson affirmative action precedents, but rather
borrowed its strong-basis-in-evidence test from the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, which includes Croson and Wygant.159 The Supreme Court should not
be presumed to have overruled the Weber and Johnson cases sub silentio, meaning that there must be some cases still governed by the Weber–Johnson
doctrine.160
The Second Circuit attempted to clarify the line between situations governed
by Ricci and affirmative action plans governed by Weber and Johnson.
According to the Second Circuit, that distinction turns on whether the employer’s
conduct involves a forward-looking procedure benefitting an entire class or backward-looking individualized relief upsetting previously established procedures.
The court explains:
[W]hen an employer, acting ex ante, although in the light of past discrimination, establishes hiring or promotion procedures designed to promote equal opportunity and eradicate future discrimination, that may constitute an
affirmative action plan. But where an employer, already having established its
procedures in a certain way—such as through a seniority system—throws out
the results of those procedures ex post because of the racial or gender composition of those results, that constitutes an individualized grant of employment
benefits which must be individually justified [under Ricci], and not affirmative
action.161

158. See United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 99 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court has never
said what, for purposes of the Weber/Johnson defense to § 703(a), is an affirmative action plan.”).
159. See SULLIVAN & ZIMMER, supra note 1, at 162 (“While Ricci did not expressly discuss the
validity of affirmative action under the Weber/Johnson analysis, there is at least considerable tension
between its analysis and that of the earlier cases.”); supra note 129 and accompanying text; see also
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 626 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This litigation does not
involve affirmative action. But if the voluntary affirmative action at issue in Johnson does not
discriminate within the meaning of Title VII, neither does an employer’s reasonable effort to comply
with Title VII’s disparate-impact provision by refraining from action of doubtful consistency with
business necessity.”); Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that Ricci did not
implicitly overrule Weber and Johnson); Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New Standard
for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 255–56 (2011) (arguing that
Ricci’s holding must be confined to tests already taken, but that its dicta may suggest a new standard for
voluntary affirmative action); Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative
Action After Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285, 287 (2010) (arguing that Ricci involved a
“stealth erosion” of Weber and Johnson).
160. See Shea, 796 F.3d at 54–55.
161. Brennan, 650 F.3d at 102; see also SULLIVAN & ZIMMER, supra note 1, at 162–63. The Second
Circuit concluded that awarding retroactive competitive seniority relief fell on the Ricci side of the line,
as ex post individualized restorative remedies rather than affirmative action plans. See Brennan, 650
F.3d at 104–05, 109.
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If the Second Circuit has drawn the line between Ricci and Weber–Johnson
correctly, then our hypothetical employer should be governed by Weber–
Johnson.162 The employer is not discarding, altering, or modifying the results of
an announced test or an established procedure to provide backward-looking individualized relief. Rather, our hypothetical employer recognized that past discrimination can produce unintended bias in algorithmic output, saw indications of that
possibility when testing the algorithm design, and introduced the fairness constraint acting ex ante to benefit an entire class of racial minorities and provide
equal opportunities in the hiring process. Indeed, race-aware fairness constraints
in many ways resemble traditional affirmative action plans that set hiring goals
for minorities.163 Group fairness constraints that require metrics like selection
rates or false negative rates to be within some defined interval are just more mathematically complex and conceptually nuanced measures of the types of targets
adopted in Weber and Johnson.164 Individual fairness and counterfactual fairness
concepts carry these ideas a step further, but they too are roughly analogous to
traditional affirmative action plans.
Is our hypothetical employer’s affirmative action plan valid? Under Weber and
Johnson, an affirmative action plan is valid if: (1) there exists “manifest imbalance” in “traditionally segregated job categories”;165 (2) the plan does not
“unnecessarily trammel[]” the rights of other employees or present an “absolute
bar to their advancement”;166 and (3) the plan is temporary if it “sets aside positions according to specific numbers.”167
The first requirement presents the biggest hurdle and will be met if the
employer can point to a racial or gender imbalance in the relevant job category.
For example, if Amazon introduced a gender-aware fairness constraint in an algorithm used to hire for technology jobs, it should satisfy the first requirement

162. The Second Circuit’s opinion in Brennan was cited with approval by the D.C. Circuit in Shea,
796 F.3d at 55. In Shea, the court found that Weber and Johnson controlled (rather than Ricci) because
the employer in Shea “did not modify the outcomes of personnel processes for the asserted purpose of
avoiding disparate-impact liability under Title VII,” but instead “acted to ‘expand[] job opportunities for
minorities and women’ and to ‘eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation.’” Id. at 55 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 622 (1987), and
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)).
163. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621–22, 636 (involving an agency’s long-term goal of a work force
“whose composition reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force” and a
short-term goal of “3 women for the 55 expected openings in [the Skilled Craft Workers] job category—
a modest goal of about 6% for that category”); Weber, 443 U.S. at 199 (upholding a collectively
bargained affirmative action plan providing that “at least 50% of the new trainees were to be black until
the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the . . . plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the
local labor force”).
164. See supra Section I.B.2 for group fairness metrics.
165. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197);
see Corrada, supra note 159, at 243.
166. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637–38; see Corrada, supra note 159, at 243–44 (arguing that an employer
cannot require discharge of white employees or pose absolute bar to their advancement).
167. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639–40; see Corrada, supra note 159, at 244 (“[The plan] can only be used
to attain, and not to maintain, racial balance.”).
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because of historical male dominance in technology jobs.168 Indeed, similar historical imbalances can be an important factor motivating employers to switch
from subjective human decisions to machine-assisted decisions.
But, unlike Amazon, some employers considering the use of machine-learning
algorithms may not be able to point to an existing imbalance in workforce demographics in traditionally segregated job categories. Those employers should still
be able to use a race- or gender-aware fairness constraint if, during the design of
an algorithmic hiring or promotion process, they learn that an unconstrained algorithm would likely produce actionable statistical disparities. On this point, Weber
and Johnson, decided in the 1970s and 1980s, may require clarification or updating to deal with the new realities of machine-learning processes that tend to reproduce the effects of past bias in new employment decisions.
A sensible modification to (or clarification of) the first Weber–Johnson requirement would be to permit race-based “affirmative action” design adjustments to a
procedure that has not yet been established, but only if either: (a) there exists a
manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories (Weber–Johnson),
or (b) in the absence of the race-based adjustment, the procedure is likely to produce a statistical disparity that would satisfy a prima facie case of either disparate
impact (Griggs)169 or systemic disparate treatment (Teamsters, Hazelwood).170
Professor Roberto Corrada has argued that the voluntary compliance dicta in
Ricci should be read as signaling that voluntary affirmative action is still permissible after Ricci if an employer can point to “a statistical showing disciplined by a
technical analysis . . . in affirmative action or voluntary remediation cases in
which a test has not yet been given.”171 This idea comports with the Second
Circuit’s distinction between backward-looking, Ricci-like conduct and forwardlooking, voluntary affirmative action plans. After a test is given or a selection
procedure is established, the employer can take race-based action to remedy statistical disparities only if it shows a strong basis in evidence of disparate impact
liability, including a consideration of the employer’s defenses. But before a test is
168. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
169. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (first recognizing a disparate
impact claim under Title VII where a minimum educational or intelligence test requirement had the
effect of disqualifying minorities at “a substantially higher rate than white applicants”).
170. See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977) (approving the
use of statistical analysis of disparities in applying the systemic disparate treatment theory to hiring
practices); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (first recognizing a
systemic disparate treatment theory under Title VII where a plaintiff can demonstrate that “racial
discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual
practice.”).
171. Corrada, supra note 159, at 259 (emphasis omitted) (asserting that standard deviation or
regression analysis would satisfy statistical showing). Corrada bases his argument on the Ricci Court’s
approving citation of Croson and, in particular, on Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Wygant.
See id. For the application of standard deviation analysis, see Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.14. For
multivariate regression analysis, see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398–404 (1986). Although
Professor Corrada’s analysis focused on a prima facie showing of systemic disparate treatment, similar
logic would support forward-looking affirmative action steps in response to a prima facie showing that
disparate impact would result from a contemplated, but not yet administered, employment practice.
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given or procedure is established, the employer can take forward-looking, racebased action if it has a “firm basis for determining that affirmative action is warranted,” which could be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support only a prima
facie showing of disparity, without consideration of the employer’s possible
defenses.172 Applying this modification to Weber–Johnson’s first requirement, an
employer would be able to implement a race-aware fairness constraint in a
machine-learning algorithm if it had evidence to show that an unconstrained algorithm would likely produce disparities sufficient to trigger a prima facie case of
disparate impact173 or systemic disparate treatment.174
This view of the first requirement is further supported by existing EEOC regulations, which indicate that employers “may take affirmative action based on an
analysis which reveals facts constituting actual or potential adverse impact, if
such adverse impact is likely to result from existing or contemplated practices.”175 The EEOC regulations recognize that race-based affirmative action may
be justified by potential adverse impact that is likely to result from contemplated
practices, apart from whether the employer can point to an existing manifest
imbalance.176 The EEOC regulations further clarify that, where an employer’s
self-analysis shows that a practice will “tend to have an adverse effect,” it has a
reasonable basis to adopt affirmative action measures “without regard to whether
there exists arguable defenses to a title VII action.”177 This is consistent with
Professor Corrada’s view that forward-looking, race-based affirmative action is
justified by a prima facie case of statistical disparity, without regard to the business necessity defense.
The second Weber–Johnson requirement, that the action not “unnecessarily
trammel” others’ rights or pose an “absolute bar” to their advancement, should be
readily met in algorithmic affirmative action cases. The race-aware fairness constraint in our hypothetical would introduce race and fairness metrics as only one
172. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that such a “firm basis” standard would be met by “demonstrable
evidence of a disparity . . . sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice claim”); see
Corrada, supra note 159, at 259–60 (stating that a prima facie case of systemic discrimination should be
“strong enough to ground voluntary remedial efforts”).
173. Here, the EEOC’s four-fifths rule of thumb for selection procedures could guide the employer.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018).
174. Here, Hazelwood’s “greater than two or three standard deviations” test, 433 U.S. at 309 n.14,
and Bazemore’s discussion of the evidentiary value of multivariate regressions, 478 U.S. at 398–404,
could guide the employer.
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(a) (2018) (emphasis added). In her Ricci dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued
that the city should have been given the opportunity, on remand, to invoke reliance on this regulation as
“a shield to liability.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 631 n.9 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She
notes that 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(a) authorizes affirmative action “based on an analysis which reveals facts
constituting actual or potential adverse impact,” and that “[i]f ‘affirmative action’ is in order, so is the
lesser step of discarding a dubious selection device.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(a) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
176. In a separate subsection, the Guidelines authorize affirmative action “to correct the effects of
prior discriminatory practices,” which “can be initially identified by a comparison between the
employer’s work force . . . and an appropriate segment of the labor force.” 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(b).
177. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(b)(1), (3).
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component of the algorithm. It would, of course, not pose an absolute bar to the
selection of majority candidates for hiring or promotion. And race-aware fairness
constraints are not likely to “unnecessarily trammel” the rights of those in the majority in failure-to-hire or failure-to-promote applications. Short of setting a
tightly defined demographic-parity fairness rule and using that algorithmic fairness rule to make determinations about which current employees to terminate (as
opposed to hire or promote), algorithmic affirmative action should not run afoul
of the second requirement.178
The third Weber–Johnson requirement is designed to ensure that affirmative
action measures are used to attain, but not maintain, balance in workforce demographics.179 Where a plan sets aside a specific number or percentage of positions
for underrepresented groups, the plan may need to include express assurance that
it is temporary.180 This requirement arguably would apply to use of a restrictive
demographic parity fairness constraint, which demands that an algorithm produce
a positive prediction (good employee) at equal rates for majority and minority
groups.181 It likely would not apply to other race-aware measures of algorithmic
fairness.182 In any event, the race-aware affirmative measures should be viewed
as necessary to “attain” fair results from the use of a particular hiring or promotion process, rather than a means of “maintaining” a certain quota, ratio, or demographic balance in the employer’s workforce in perpetuity. The EEOC
regulations require an ongoing evaluation of any race-based measures: “The race,
sex, and national origin conscious provisions of the [affirmative action] plan or
program should be maintained only so long as is necessary” to achieve the objectives identified by the employer in the self-analysis and to “ensure that employment systems operate fairly in the future, while avoiding unnecessary restrictions
on opportunities for the workforce as a whole.”183
Employers can and should continually reassess their algorithm model design,
including a reassessment of whether a race-aware fairness constraint remains necessary to avoid statistical disparities that would trigger a prima facie case of disparate impact or systemic disparate treatment.184 Combined with the modification

178. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (“Thus, denial of the promotion
unsettled no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on the part of petitioner. Furthermore, while petitioner
in this case was denied a promotion, he retained his employment with the Agency . . . and remained
eligible for other promotions.”); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (“[T]he plan
does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees.”).
179. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630, 639.
180. See id. at 639–40.
181. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Sections I.B.2–4.
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(c)(2)(i) (1979).
184. Cf. id. (“The plan should be tailored to solve the problems which were identified in the self
analysis and to ensure that employment systems operate fairly in the future, while avoiding unnecessary
restrictions on opportunities for the workforce as a whole. The race, sex, and national origin conscious
provisions of the plan or program should be maintained only so long as is necessary to achieve these
objectives.” (citation omitted)).
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to Weber–Johnson’s manifest imbalance requirement, this understanding of the
third Weber–Johnson requirement would make for a sensible approach to voluntary, race-aware fairness techniques in designing algorithmic hiring models and
would be consistent with the EEOC’s Guidelines on affirmative action.
E. A FINAL STATUTORY HURDLE: ARE MACHINE-LEARNING ALGORITHMS “EMPLOYMENT
RELATED TESTS” SUBJECT TO SECTION 703(L)?

If race-aware fairness constraints are justified as valid affirmative action plans
under Weber–Johnson, one final statutory hurdle remains: section 703(l)’s prohibition on race-norming. As the Introduction illustrated, using different cutoffs
for, or adjusting the scores of, “employment related tests” according to race, gender, or another protected characteristic (that is, race-norming) is prohibited by
section 703(l).185 This is true even for affirmative action plans that are otherwise
valid under Weber–Johnson.186 The hypothetical City of Springfield therefore
could not differentially weight its firefighter-promotion exam by race even if it
tried to do so as part of a valid affirmative action plan.
Some algorithmic fairness techniques use protected traits to identify variables
that predict success for one particular group (for example, females), even if different values of the same variable predict success for other groups (for example,
males). As Professor Dwork articulates, using the race or gender variable can
help provide important context, like cultural differences, that can actually
increase the accuracy of target variable predictions within groups.187 Dwork gives
the following example:
Suppose you had a minority group in which the smart students were steered toward math and science, and a dominant group in which the smart students
were steered toward finance. Now if someone wanted to write a quick-anddirty classifier to find smart students, maybe they should just look for students
who study finance because, after all, the majority is much bigger than the minority, and so the classifier will be pretty accurate overall. The problem is that
not only is this unfair to the minority, but it also has reduced utility compared
to a classifier that understands that if you’re a member of the minority and you
study math, you should be viewed as similar to a member of the majority who
studies finance. That gave rise to the title of the paper, “Fairness Through
Awareness,” meaning cross-cultural awareness.188

Is this kind of algorithmic affirmative action a variant of race-norming of
employment-related tests that is prohibited by section 703(l)? Are other fairness
constraints, like group fairness and counterfactual fairness, prohibited under

185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2012).
186. See Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2006) (arguing that even if the
process was a valid affirmative action plan, it must not violate the specific prohibitions of section 703(l)).
187. See supra notes 18 and 46.
188. Hartnett, supra note 18.
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section 703(l)? This section contends that the answer should be no, based on the
text, history, and purpose of section 703(l).
First, the text of section 703(l) covers only employment-related tests. It does
not, by its terms, cover machine-learning algorithms, observational data review
techniques or formulas, or hiring or promotion procedures or practices other than
employment-related tests.189 Congress did not define employment-related tests in
Title VII.190 The use of this narrow term stands in contrast to Title VII’s disparate
impact provisions (also added by Congress in 1991), which use the broader term
“employment practice” to describe employer conduct that may trigger disparate
impact liability.191 Likewise, the primary operative provisions of Title VII use the
broader term employment practice.192 The narrow use of employment-related
tests in section 703(l) also differs from broader language used elsewhere in federal antidiscrimination statutes. For example, the ADA refers to “qualification
standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability.”193 These textual differences suggest
that section 703(l)’s more narrowly drawn prohibition does not apply to employment standards, criteria, or selection procedures other than employment-related
tests.194
Second, the legislative history of section 703(l) shows that its drafters never
contemplated its application to non-testing selection procedures. Nor did its
drafters envision it governing complex systems, like fairness-constrained
machine-learning algorithms, that are now capable of evaluating the within-group
predictive accuracy of some subset of observed variables (that is, individual fairness). Rather, section 703(l) was intended to prohibit the relatively unsophisticated techniques for race- or gender-norming the overall scores of so-called
“neutral” or “nondiscriminatory” ability tests taken by applicants. This purpose is
shown in the debates over race-norming scores on ability tests like the
Department of Labor’s General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) that occurred in
the lead-up to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.195
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(l).
190. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (lacking any explanation of what constitutes an employmentrelated test).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (stating that using “a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact” can establish an unlawful employment practice (emphasis added)).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (c) (using the same
language in describing defenses).
194. The EEOC’s regulations interpreting Title VII also describe a category of employment selection
procedures beyond tests. For example, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,
adopted in 1978, apply to “tests and other selection procedures which are used as a basis for any
employment decision[s].” See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(B) (2018).
195. See Paul S. Greenlaw & Sanne S. Jensen, Race-Norming and The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 25
PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 13, 13 (1996); Kimberly West-Faulcon, Fairness Feuds: Competing
Conceptions of Title VII Discriminatory Testing, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1051–52 (2011) (“In
the politically turbulent years during which Congress debated the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and the
1991 Act, the race norming of employment test scores became a hot button political issue and the
subject of intense media scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)).
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By the late 1980s, the Department of Labor’s GATB was the most widely used
employment test, used to screen and refer applicants for many public and private
sector jobs.196 Based on a statistical analysis suggesting that the GATB could
serve as a valid predictive test “for selecting employees for all 12,000 jobs in the
U.S. economy,” the Department of Labor initiated a job-referral system using
GATB results.197 Realizing that the use of GATB raw score rankings would lead
to racially disparate results and likely run afoul of the disparate impact doctrine
announced in Griggs, the Department of Labor race-normed the scores by converting raw GATB scores into a “racial-group-based percentile ranking.”198 A
raw score of 300 on the GATB might place a white candidate at the forty-fifth
percentile for white test-takers, but that same raw score might place a black candidate at the eighty-third percentile of black test-takers.199 Referrals were then
made using the percentile score. This type of simplistic race-norming was a
highly divisive issue during the 1991 congressional debates over civil rights
reform.200
Congress’s 1990 attempt to amend the Civil Rights Act was vetoed by
President George H.W. Bush out of concern that it would lead employers to hire
by quota.201 The 1990 bill did not include express prohibition on race-norming,
and some believed it actually required race-norming to avoid disparate impact
liability from testing.202 Following President Bush’s veto, the 102nd Congress
began a second effort at reforming Title VII. The first bill to directly address
race-norming was Senate Bill 478, introduced by Senator Alan Simpson.203 That
bill included a section entitled “Prohibition on Discrimination in Employment
Ability Tests.”204 The operative language read:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, when selecting
applicants for employment, or when selecting current employees for promotion, to interpret or adjust the results of ability tests in a manner that would

196. The Department of Labor’s GATB included twelve subtests designed to evaluate various skills
and qualities, including “cognitive, perceptual and manual dexterity skills.” See Greenlaw & Jensen,
supra note 195, at 13.
197. West-Faulcon, supra note 195, at 1053–54; see also Greenlaw & Jensen, supra note 195, at
13–14.
198. West-Faulcon, supra note 195, at 1055; see also Greenlaw & Jensen, supra note 195, at 14
(stating that race-norming was invented “to promote federal equal employment opportunity and
affirmative action goals”).
199. See Greenlaw & Jensen, supra note 195, at 14.
200. See West-Faulcon, supra note 195, at 1051–52. Other forms of simplistic race-norming added
points to the scores of minority candidates. See Greenlaw & Jensen, supra note 195, at 14.
201. See Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict
Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 148–51
(1993); Greenlaw & Jensen, supra note 195, at 18; Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job
Rights; Showdown Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A1.
202. See Greenlaw & Jensen, supra note 195, at 18.
203. See S. 478, 102d Cong. (1991); see also Govan, supra note 201, at 179.
204. S. 478, 102d Cong. § 5 (1991).
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discriminate against any individual because of the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of the individual.205

A second subsection provided that, in disparate impact cases where the
employer had demonstrated a business necessity for an “ability test,” plaintiffs
could not prevail by showing that the results could have been “adjusted on the basis of” a protected characteristic in order to “reduce the disparate impact of the
test.”206
Senator Simpson explained that his bill addressed the “new issue” of “whether
neutral, nondiscriminatory employment tests should be race normed” to benefit
minority groups.207 Senator Simpson cited support from R. Gaull Silberman, the
Vice Chairman of the EEOC, and offered a transcript of her remarks opposed to
race-norming employment tests. Vice Chair Silberman specifically cited the
“within-group” race-norming of the GATB by State Employment Service offices.208 She also cited differential standards under the Foreign Service Officer
competitive written exam and an employer’s competitive test that was “a sample
of the actual job.”209 The issue of race-norming remained one of the key
issues during the 1991 debates and negotiations over compromise, bipartisan
bills.210 Despite early indications to the contrary, Democrats in the House of
Representatives realized that any successful bill would need to include language
prohibiting race-norming of written tests.211
Senator Simpson’s bill was referred to committee but did not advance further.
A bipartisan compromise bill (Senate Bill 1745) eventually emerged in
September 1991 that included similar (though not identical) language prohibiting
within-group norming.212 That language would eventually become section 703(l)
of Title VII. Statements in support of Senate Bill 1745 show that the concern
motivating the relevant language was the practice of adjusting scores for ability
tests like the GATB.213
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that section 703(l) was directed at
any employment-selection procedures other than neutral and nondiscriminatory
employment related tests, like the GATB and similar ability tests were claimed to

205. Id. § 5(m)(1) (emphasis added).
206. Id. § 5(m)(2).
207. 137 CONG. REC. 9077 (1991) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson).
208. Id. at 9,077–78 (excerpts of comments of R. Gaull Silberman before the Equal Employment
Advisory Council, Feb. 28, 1991).
209. Id. at 9,078.
210. See Govan, supra note 201, at 6, 183–84, 188, 190 (describing race-norming of tests as one of
four major policy issues in the debates and noting that “in the political context it was dynamite”).
211. See id. at 184, 188, 190.
212. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
213. See 137 CONG. REC. H9547 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. John Danforth) (“This
means, for instance, that discriminatory use of the Generalized Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) by the
Department of Labor’s and state employment agencies’ is illegal.”); 137 CONG. REC. S15,476 (daily ed.
Oct. 30, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. H3951 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (citing the “controversial score
adjustments” for the GATB “which has sparked the debate over race norming”).
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be. There is no evidence in the legislative history even hinting that an employer
operating within a valid affirmative action plan is prohibited from “adjusting” or
setting separate “cutoffs” for any other items in a candidate’s portfolio when
making comparisons between candidates. Imagine, for example, an employer
operating within a valid affirmative action plan who considers for interviews only
those white applicants having at least a 3.0 high school GPA but considers minority applicants with at least a 2.75 GPA. There is nothing in the text or the legislative history suggesting that section 703(l) would prohibit such a practice. It may
be the use of a different cutoff for a hiring criterion, but it is not a different cutoff
for an employment-related test. The employer uses GPA in this scenario as a predictor of future success. Algorithms using observational variables to make predictions about future success are likewise not employment-related tests. And, of
course, there is nothing in the 1991 legislative history suggesting the possible
application of section 703(l) to complex machine-learning processes (which had
not yet been developed) performing calculations on a set of observed variables.
Section 703(l) was included in the 1991 Civil Rights Act as part of a larger
compromise. The widespread race-norming of general aptitude tests was controversial, and section 703(l) definitively ended that practice. But section 703(l) was
limited in scope to employment-related tests. It did not prevent the use of different cutoffs or adjustments for other selection processes or criteria. It did not prohibit the use of preferences pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan.214 And it
does not prohibit an employer’s use of race-aware fairness constraints in
machine-learning algorithms as part of a valid affirmative action plan.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO ALGORITHMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
For public sector employers, race-aware fairness constraints can also be challenged as a constitutional equal protection violation.215 Although the constitutional question is framed differently, many of the central considerations are the
same as for the statutory analysis. This Part examines how algorithmic affirmative action may fare under the Court’s recent Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. The discussion focuses on the public employer hiring context, though a
similar analysis would be applicable to other governmental uses of algorithmic
fairness constraints, such as public university admissions processes.
214. See Civil Rights Act § 116 (“Nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to
affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with
the law.”); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges Five Bullets, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 235 (1998) (“Whether or not section 116 amounts to a full reenactment of Weber/
Johnson, it is a statement recognizing the law in those cases. Thus, under any view, section 116 bolsters
Weber/Johnson and the stare decisis effect that the courts should give to that law.”).
215. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995) (holding that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”); City of Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge
to a municipal contract system that favored minority-owned businesses); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based preferences in school board
layoffs).
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Would the City of Springfield’s use of an algorithm with a race-aware fairness
constraint to make firefighter promotions survive constitutional challenge? The
starting point for the constitutional analysis is the text of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”216
A. CLASSIFICATION: IS ALGORITHMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RACE-NEUTRAL?

The Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena held that “all racial
classifications” by governmental actors must be justified under the strict scrutiny
test; they must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.217 In Adarand, the Court held that the federal Department of Transportation’s
affirmative action program providing race-based preferences in awarding contracts could be justified “only for the most compelling reasons.”218
An initial question is whether the state employer’s use of a race-aware fairness
constraint is a racial “classification” at all. Professor Sam Bagenstos observes
that the Court’s most recent equal protection cases have placed tremendous importance on the meaning of the term classification219––a term the Court has never
defined.220 Bagenstos predicts that the importance placed on the meaning of classification may lead the Court to “interpret[] the concept elastically, by balancing
the equal protection interests it finds salient, but doing so offstage.”221 Whether a
race-aware algorithmic fairness constraint constitutes a classification is a complex question, especially in light of the Court’s ambiguity. The answer may
depend on the specific type of fairness constraint (group, individual, or causal/
counterfactual) and on the method of implementation (preprocessing, optimization penalties, or other methods).

216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision of the Fourteenth Amendment directly protects
employees or applicants for employment by state or local governments. The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause protects employees or applicants for federal employment, and its protections have been
held to be coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 227 (“[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.”).
217. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
218. See id.
219. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal
Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1166 (2016) (“By
formalistically relying on the existence of a classification as the trigger for strict scrutiny, the Court’s
approach puts great pressure on the definition of ‘classification.’”).
220. See id. at 1119 n.10 (citing Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Forward: Equality
Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2013)).
221. See id. at 1166. Bagenstos posits that the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved to mean that all
racial classifications must meet strict scrutiny but that race-neutral state actions that are not
classifications will be subjected to strict scrutiny only if adopted to “harm [a] racial group[],” rather than
for the purpose of “promot[ing] integration or clos[ing] racial gaps.” See id. at 1158–59.
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Some guideposts do exist.222 Equal protection cases where racial classifications
must have occurred include the affirmative action cases Gratz v. Bollinger,223
Grutter v. Bollinger,224 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,225 and Adarand,226 each of which required the application of strict
scrutiny.227 At the other end of the spectrum, the Court has approvingly considered examples of formally race-neutral techniques that do not appear to count as
racial classifications, even though motivated by race-conscious goals. One example is Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan, in which high school students graduating in
the top ten percent of their class are automatically admitted to the state university.
The top ten percent aspect of the University’s admission plan was not subject to
strict scrutiny in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,228 even though it was
unquestionably adopted with the specific purpose of improving racial balance.229
Justice Kennedy gave other examples in his concurrence in Parents Involved:
“strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.”230 According to Justice
Kennedy, these techniques may be “race conscious” but they “do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be
defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be
found permissible.”231
Ricci is a tougher case to characterize. It may have involved a racial classification in the Court’s view. The majority described the city’s conduct in refusing to
certify the test results as “express, race-based decisionmaking” even though the

222. See id. at 1157 (describing cases where the state “concededly act[ed] on the basis of the race of
the particular individuals who sought a benefit from them”).
223. 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003) (involving the use of race to award a predetermined amount of points
in undergraduate admissions to the University of Michigan).
224. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (involving the use of race as just one factor in a more nebulous and
flexible manner in law school admissions in service of the compelling state interest of promoting
diversity in higher education).
225. 551 U.S. 701, 709–10, 717 (2007) (involving the use of race in determining school assignments
and ruling on transfer requests in public school districts, where districts maintained predetermined range
of target racial balance in schools).
226. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (involving the use of race in making rebuttable presumptions of social
and economic disadvantage in connection with awarding federal government contract work).
227. See Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 1157.
228. 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2209 (2016).
229. See Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 1145 (“Notably, none of the justices who joined the majority
opinion . . . expressed any doubt that the ‘Top Ten Percent plan,’ which was framed in race-neutral
terms but plainly aimed at increasing racial diversity, was constitutional” (footnote omitted)); Siegel,
supra note 149, at 674 (“No Justice raised questions about the constitutionality of the percent plan. The
Court’s acceptance of the percent plan illustrates that government may act in race-conscious but facially
neutral ways to promote equal opportunity, even where government seeks to alter racial outcomes.”
(emphasis omitted)).
230. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
231. See id.
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city had the benign purpose of avoiding impact liability from the racially skewed
outcome of the testing.232 On the other hand, the city’s conduct in refusing to certify test results might be thought of as formally race-neutral.233 As others have
observed, one plausible reading of Ricci is that the city’s conduct was a racial
classification, rather than race-neutral conduct, only because the city acted after
administering the tests and learning which candidates would be eligible for promotions.234 If that reading is correct, then perhaps the forward-looking use of a
race-aware fairness constraint is formally race-neutral, in the same sense that disparate impact legislation itself can be thought of as formally race-neutral.235 The
reading would require the algorithm’s output to meet some overall group target
range, which necessarily requires consideration of race in the aggregate, but it
would not make individual determinations on the basis of race in the same way as
Gratz (automatically awarding points to individual applicants according to race)
or Parents Involved (after a certain threshold was reached, denying school transfer requests if the individual requesting student would contribute to racial imbalance). Of course, this question is by no means settled. The definition of
classification remains murky. Courts could readily conclude that some or all of
the race-aware fairness constraints described in Part I constitute classifications
for equal protection purposes and therefore demand strict scrutiny.
Of the three basic types of race-aware fairness constraints described in Part I, a
government’s use of group fairness constraints seems most vulnerable to constitutional attack. The starkest example would be governmental use of a demographic-parity constraint, where positive (good employee) predictions must be
made at the same (or nearly the same) rate for both the majority and minority
groups. Without any carve-out for business relatedness, the government’s use of
a race-aware, demographic-parity constraint in an algorithm could easily be equated to a form of quota and deemed to impose a racial classification.236 In contrast,
an individual fairness constraint may not constitute racial classifications. Because
it operates by identifying individuals who are similar as measured by relevant
variables and then comparing the predictions for those individuals, an individual

232. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009); see supra text accompanying note 121; see also
Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 1151 (“One way of reading the Ricci Court’s holding . . . is that even
formally race-neutral efforts to avoid racially disparate impacts are the equivalent of racial
classifications.”).
233. See Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 1150 (“New Haven’s refusal to certify the promotion tests
could be understood as formally race-neutral.”).
234. See id. at 1151; Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341,
1369–74 (2010) (describing a “visible victims” reading of Ricci); Siegel, supra note 149, at 682–83.
235. See Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 1130 (“Because prohibitions on disparate impact do not
individually classify people based on their race, in this view, the prohibitions are not themselves
constitutionally suspect simply because they seek to achieve the ‘race-conscious’ goals of promoting
integration and closing racial gaps.”).
236. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (holding that a race-conscious higher
education admission plan cannot be narrowly tailored if it uses a “quota system,” but can be narrowly
tailored if it uses race in a “flexible, nonmechanical way” as part of an admissions program that involves
“truly individualized consideration” of applicants).
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fairness approach might be described as race-aware but race-neutral.
Counterfactual fairness might also be understood as race-neutral rather than as a
racial classification. Although it requires knowledge and manipulation of each
individual’s race variable, the counterfactual fairness model does not care
whether any individual’s race is switched from black to white or vice-versa. It
demands only that the machine’s predictions in the racially counterfactual world
closely resemble the machine’s predictions under the actual facts.
Perhaps the most interesting implication of the Court’s recent equal protection
jurisprudence is an idea that both legal and machine-learning scholars have not
yet seized upon: algorithmic affirmative action might be on better legal footing if
it were designed to operate in formally race-neutral ways, despite its admitted
and obvious race-conscious purpose. Imagine, for example, an algorithm that is
formally blinded to each individual’s race, but is optimized to achieve counterfactual fairness when the person’s neighborhood is flipped from a poor neighborhood known to be predominantly minority to a wealthy one known to be
predominantly white. Think of it as algorithmic affirmative action by proxy. It
would work on the same principle as the Texas ten percent plan and Justice
Kennedy’s example of drawing school district lines with knowledge of the general neighborhood demographics. Of course, the machine, if asked to, could accurately guess each individual’s probable race based on the individual’s
neighborhood, but the same is true of human decisionmakers drawing school district lines. Under the Court’s recent equal protection jurisprudence, known proxies for protected characteristics can be leveraged in algorithm design to
accomplish the race-conscious goal of reducing racial disparities in race-neutral
ways.
B. APPLYING SCRUTINY

Assuming that governmental use of a race- or gender-aware fairness constraint
is a classification for equal protection purposes, should it survive heightened scrutiny? Under current equal protection jurisprudence, a race-aware constraint
would need to be narrowly tailored to compelling governmental interest (strict
scrutiny).237 A gender-aware constraint would need to be substantially related to
an important governmental interest (intermediate scrutiny).238
The governmental interest at stake in either case would be avoiding unintended
discrimination on the basis of race or sex in hiring that would otherwise be

237. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
238. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “anomalous result that the Government can more easily enact
affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against women than it can enact affirmativeaction programs to remedy discrimination against African-Americans—even though the primary
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves”). The Court
has not equated sex-based classifications with racial classifications, which receive the highest level of
scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Court “has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies
opportunity to women (or to men).” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
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produced by an unconstrained algorithm, due to one or more sources of bias identified by Barocos and Selbst.239 Whether this is a compelling or substantial governmental interest is unclear. The only two interests that the Supreme Court has
definitively held compelling enough to satisfy strict scrutiny are remedying the
effects of prior intentional discrimination by the state actor in question240 and diversity in higher education.241 Remedying the effects of general societal discrimination was held not sufficiently compelling in Croson.242
Some governmental employers may fit within the first recognized compelling
interest, if they can point to their own prior intentional discrimination. But many
other governmental actors will need to look elsewhere for a compelling interest.
It is an open question whether diversity in public employment (or in certain
spheres of public employment) is a compelling interest.243 Short of a diversity interest, perhaps the governmental actor has a sufficient interest in preventing its
own contemplated employment practices from producing statistical disparate
impact by reproducing the effects of prior discrimination.244 There is some
authority, if attenuated, for this view. Although it was resolved on purely statutory grounds,245 Johnson approved gender-based affirmative action by a government employer even in the absence of a showing that the manifest imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories was traceable to the defendant’s own prior,
intentional discrimination.246 Second, the EEOC regulations interpret Title VII to
permit race-conscious affirmative action when a self-analysis shows that a contemplated practice is likely to lead to actual or potential disparate impacts.247 We
should not lightly presume the EEOC adopted an interpretation of Title VII that
condones racial classifications under circumstances that would never establish a
compelling state interest. Third, Justice Ginsburg observed that affirmative action
might have been warranted under the facts in Ricci, which did not involve the

239. See supra Section I.A.
240. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–21 (2007);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion).
241. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720, 722; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
242. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
243. Compare Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the City
of Chicago has set out a compelling operational need for a diverse police department”), with Rothe Dev.
Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023, 1027, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that there was no
“substantially probative and broad-based statistical foundation” justifying a “nationwide, race-conscious
action” implemented by the Department of Defense to award defense contracts to entities controlled by
“socially and economically disadvantaged individuals”), and Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d
437, 445–46 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[a] race-conscious promotion system” favoring women and
minorities “cannot pass constitutional scrutiny”).
244. See Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding Injustice,
in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 105, 120 (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds.,
2018).
245. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987).
246. See id. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Most importantly, the plan’s purpose was assuredly not to
remedy prior sex discrimination by the Agency. It could not have been, because there was no prior sex
discrimination to remedy.”).
247. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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remediation of the City of New Haven’s own prior discrimination.248 Finally,
there is academic support for the proposition that affirmative action ought to be
justified where deployed in response to statistical evidence of disparities (short of
findings of prior intentional discrimination)249 or to prevent discrimination within
an employer’s own workplace.250
If there is a compelling interest, are race-aware fairness constraints narrowly
tailored to serve that interest? The answer is necessarily dependent on the algorithmic design selected, other race-neutral or less restrictive options considered,
and how the algorithm’s predictions are being used. But a few generalizations
can be made. First, algorithms used in making hiring or promotion decisions are
much more likely to be upheld than algorithms used to make termination or layoff
decisions.251 Second, race-aware algorithmic fairness constraints by their nature
do not define individuals solely by their race, but include race as just one factor
among all the observed variables available in the data. In this way, they more
closely resemble the narrowly-tailored law school admissions practices upheld in
Grutter (race as one factor in holistic review)252 than they do the undergraduate
admissions practices struck down in Gratz (awarding individuals predefined
points based on race).253 This cuts in favor of finding that race-aware fairness constraints are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interests.
Finally, before voluntarily instituting any race-aware fairness constraint, government employers should consider other less restrictive options, which may
include formally race-neutral means that operate on proxies to accomplish raceconscious goals. Simply blinding the algorithm to the sensitive variable will not
work in most cases. But, blinding the algorithm and then leveraging known proxies to calculate a fairness constraint might work to avoid or reduce racially disparate impacts from the algorithmic output. If a governmental employer does choose
a race-aware fairness constraint, it should be as flexible as possible while still capable of serving its purposes. For example, a group fairness metric should not
demand strict equality between, say, false-positive rates if a wider permissible
range of difference in the false-positive rates would work nearly as well in eliminating disparate impacts. If using Kusner’s counterfactual fairness technique, the
metric specified to determine whether counterfactual predictions are close enough
to predictions in the actual world should permit leeway for some differences
248. See supra note 175.
249. See Corrada, supra note 159, at 251–52, 258–59.
250. See Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
1385, 1386–87 (2003) (arguing that prevention of discrimination ought to justify affirmative action
under Title VII and that this interpretation is consistent with existing Title VII doctrine).
251. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“Though
hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury
that layoffs impose.”).
252. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). However, a strict group fairness approach,
and particularly a strict demographic parity requirement, might be equated to a quota system that was
disapproved in Grutter because it “insulat[es] the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats.” Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
253. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
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while still serving its purpose.254 By carefully cabining race-aware fairness constraints and using them only where necessary to serve the governmental interest
of preventing algorithmic disparate impacts, algorithmic affirmative action
should be able to survive strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that race-aware fairness constraints should be able to survive
both statutory disparate treatment and constitutional equal protection challenges,
at least under certain conditions. My arguments have been grounded primarily in
the applicable texts, Title VII’s legislative history, and the Supreme Court’s Title
VII and equal protection decisions. These conclusions are certainly not textually
or doctrinally preordained, and there remains substantial uncertainty in fitting
machine decisions into a body of law that was designed to govern human decisions. At this point, then, it is worth stepping back to look at the larger picture.
How does algorithmic affirmative action square with the fundamental principles
of antidiscrimination law? The answer to this question may help us predict how
courts will deal with the new complexities introduced by machine decisions.
The prevailing account is that U.S. antidiscrimination law has taken a turn
toward an anticlassification (formal equality) principle and away from an antisubordination (substantive equality) principle.255 If so, this spells trouble for raceaware fairness constraints, at least to the extent that they are understood to be
racial classifications or “race-based” conduct. The implications for the use of
machine-learning algorithms in personnel decisions would be severe. Achieving
the anticlassificatory ideal of colorblindness is impossible in the machine-learning context, because we cannot create truly colorblind algorithms. Machines are
too effective in identifying proxies. So disparate outcomes might be the inevitable
result of machine decisions, and they may well be immune from disparate impact
liability under the business-necessity defense.
But Professor Reva Siegel has advanced a third plausible explanation for the
Court’s more recent antidiscrimination decisions: an antibalkanization principle.256 If the avoidance of balkanization is the concern driving the close cases, it
could bode well for algorithmic affirmative action. Race-aware fairness constraints do not create easily identifiable, visible victims who are likely to feel as
though they have been governmentally defined and classified by their race.
Compare that to the students requesting school transfers in Parents Involved,
whose applications were denied because their race would contribute to a school’s

254. See KUSNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 2.
255. See Areheart, supra note 7 at 993–95 (“[I]t appears the Court has, in Ricci, turned hard toward
anticlassification values and away from antisubordination rationales that once animated disparate impact
analyses.”); Siegel, supra note 7, at 1287 (describing “the conventional account” that the
“anticlassification understanding of equal protection ultimately prevailed” but arguing that in reality,
neither has fully displaced the other).
256. See Siegel, supra note 7 (presenting the antibalkanization principle as a plausible explanation
for the Court’s recent antidiscrimination decisions).
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racial imbalance, or to undergraduate applicants in Gratz who learned that individuals of certain preferred races automatically received a predetermined number
of points simply because of their race. Race-aware fairness constraints operating
within a machine-learning process are not as likely to make race such a visible, salient factor in decisions, and are therefore not as likely to risk escalating social tension. Under this view, carefully circumscribed uses of race or gender variables in
calculating and applying algorithmic fairness constraints ought to be a permissible
form of voluntary compliance with the disparate impact provisions of Title VII.

